# 1AC

**1AC — KU HW**

**1AC — Innovation**

**Advantage 1 is Innovation —**

**Standards-Setting Organizations** [SSO’s] **are industry members who jointly establish standards for information tech defined by the adoption of standard-essential patents** [SEP’s]**, which are licensed to companies who wish to implement the tech in their product, called implementers, on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory** [FRAND] **terms. Current standards promote price gouging, FRAND enforcement is critical.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

I. Standard Setting and the Competitive Process

The **fundamental economics** in the **information technology** sector, driven by **network effects**, implies that there is **enormous value** associated with establishing compatibility standards. Popular standards include the mobile broadband standards used in cell phones, which are established by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and the Wi-Fi technology for wireless local area networks, which is enabled by the 802.11 standard established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).4

There are many SSOs, and their rules and procedures differ considerably. In addition to IEEE, leading SSOs include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).5 SSOs generally establish standards by holding a series of committee meetings among industry participants. These meetings culminate in a vote on a technical specification that describes what features or attributes a product must have in order to comply with the standard. Most SSOs are open to all industry participants and seek to operate on a consensus basis, applying certain voting rules. SSOs do not normally engage in patent licensing, nor do they specify how patent royalties will be divided up among patent holders. They leave that to their members, which in some cases form patent pools to address these issues.6

SSOs adopt specific policies relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs).7 These IPR policies are generally intended to enable the SEP holders to obtain reasonable royalties for licensing their patents, while prohibiting them from charging excessive royalties after other industry participants have committed to the standard. At that point, firms committed to implementing the standard— which we call “implementers”—would find it **very costly** to avoid using the patented technology. For this purpose, most SSOs require SEP owners to license their SEPs on FRAND terms.8

FRAND policies are especially necessary because negotiations between SEP holders and implementers generally **take place only after** the implementers have used and infringed the technologies claimed by the SEPs. Standards involving information and communications technology can involve hundreds or even **thousands of SEPs**, many with **uncertain boundaries** for infringement. In addition, a time lag exists between patent application and patent issuance. For these and other reasons, it is **impractical** for implementers to enter into negotiations for patent licenses with all SEP owners prior to the establishment of a standard and to their implementation of it.9

The fact that patent negotiations generally do not take place until after implementers have used and infringed the technologies has several critical implications. First, at the time of negotiation, implementers are **locked into the standard** and the technologies claimed by the SEPs—that is, the **cost to switch** to an alternative technology or standard at that point—ex post—is **much greater** than it was ex ante, before the patented technology was first included in the standard. Ex post, the patent holder is no longer competing to have its technology included in the standard, nor is it competing to have implementers of the standard use its technology. Instead, because the patent holder owns an asset that is essential to the standard, implementers have no choice but to use the patented technology.

If the standard is commercially successful, implementers are willing to pay a much larger royalty for use of the patented technology than they would have paid ex ante, when the SEP holder faced competition from other technologies. In these circumstances, the SEP holder can be said to have obtained **monopoly power** in the market in which the patented technology is licensed for use in implementing the standard.10

Second, because of lock-in and the implementer’s ongoing infringement, the **potential for litigation looms large** in licensing negotiations. In effect, the parties are negotiating about how to settle an infringement suit, and that negotiation is **heavily influenced** by their predictions as to what the court will do if they cannot agree. This situation is not unique to SEPs; it arises frequently when firms are faced with patent infringement claims for products they have independently developed or technologies they have inadvertently infringed. Patent law addresses such instances by specifying that patent holders are entitled to “**reasonable royalties**,” defined as the royalties that the parties would have negotiated prior to the infringement and thus prior to lock-in.11 Those hypothetical ex ante royalties reflect the market value of the patent license. Notwithstanding the law’s embrace of this principle, however, as a practical matter, patent holders are **generally able to recover more** than the **ex ante value** of the patent when litigation occurs after the implementers are locked in. Further, negotiations in the shadow of litigation after lock-in tend to **result in royalties in excess** of the ex ante or **market value** of the patented technology.12

Third, the shadow of litigation is **particularly problematic** in the communications and technology sector, in which products typically include hundreds or **thousands** of **patented technologies**. A court-ordered injunction involving such products would deprive the implementer of not only the value of the technology covered by the patent-in-suit, but also the value of the **entire product**.13 Implementers that are forced to bear the risk of an injunction are thus **induced to agree to royalties** greater than those that would be **appropriate** if only the value of the patented technology were at stake. Those royalties **systematically provide** SEP holders with **excessive compensation** in comparison with the benchmark of ex ante royalties.

These implications of lock-in and ex post dealings are well-understood: they represent an example of the **general concept** of **lock-in** and **opportunism** developed by Oliver Williamson.14 The Federal Circuit has also recognized the market distortions caused by the inclusion of patented technologies in public standards and the resulting danger of patent holdup involving SEPs.15

For these and other reasons, the SEP holder has ex post monopoly power that, if left unchecked, would enable it to obtain royalties **far in excess** of the royalties that it could earn in a competitive market.16 To address this common problem and limit ex post opportunism by SEP holders, SSOs typically require participants that own SEPs to make certain FRAND commitments. In particular, by requiring a commitment to license on “fair and reasonable” terms, the FRAND requirement aims to prevent, or at least reduce, the **extent of monopoly pricing** by SEP holders. And by requiring a commitment to license on “nondiscriminatory” terms, the FRAND requirement can prevent SEP holders from **extracting monopoly premiums** by selective licensing or, more important, migrating their monopoly power from the FRAND-regulated market to unregulated standard-implementing product markets by licensing to only one or a few implementers or licensing to selected implementers on discriminatorily favorable terms.

**Patent holdup is accentuated by the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in *FTC v. Qualcomm* that permits ICT firms to engage in innovation-stifling conduct with antitrust impunity.**

**Moss 20**, \*Alex Moss is a Staff Attorney on EFF’s intellectual property team, before joining EFF, Alex practiced complex commercial litigation at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP in New York and Durie Tangri LLP in San Francisco; (August 26th, 2020, “Throwing Out the FTC's Suit Against Qualcomm Moves Antitrust Law in the Wrong Direction”, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/08/throwing-out-ftcs-suit-against-qualcomm-moves-antitrust-law-wrong-direction)

Standards can enhance **competition** and **consumer choice**, but they also **massively inflate** the **value** of **patents** deemed **essential** to the standard, and give their owners the power to **sue companies** that implement the standard for **money damages** or **injunctions** to block them from using their SEPs. When standards cover critical features like wireless connectivity, SEP owners wield a huge amount of **“hold-up” power** because their patents allow them to effectively **block access** to the **standard** altogether. That lets them charge **unduly large tolls** to anyone who wants to implement the standard.

To minimize that risk, standard-setting organizations typically require companies that want their patented technology incorporated into a standard to promise in advance to license their SEPs to others on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. But that promise strikes at a **key tension** between antitrust and patent law: patent owners have **no obligation** to let anyone use technology their patent covers, but to get those technologies incorporated into standards, patent owners usually have to promise that they will give **permission** to anyone who wants to implement the standard as long as they pay a reasonable license fee.

Qualcomm is one of the most **important** and **dominant** companies in the **history** of **wireless** communication standards. It is a multinational conglomerate that has owned patents on every major wireless communication standard since its first CDMA patent in 1985, and it **participates** in the **s**tandard-**s**etting **o**rganization**s** that define those standards. Qualcomm is somewhat unique in that it not only **licenses SEPs**, but also **supplies** the **modem chips** used by a wide range of devices. These include chips that **implement** wireless communication **standards**, which lie at the **heart** of every mobile **computing device**.

Although Qualcomm promised to license its SEPs (including patents essential to CDMA, 3G, 4G, and 5G) on FRAND terms, its conduct has to many looked **unfair**, **unreasonable**, and **highly discriminatory**. In particular, Qualcomm has drawn scrutiny for bundling tens of thousands of patents together—including many that are **not** standard-**essential**—and offering portfolio-only licenses no matter what licensees actually **want** or **need**; refusing to sell modem chips to anyone without a SEP license and threatening to **withhold chips** from companies trying to **negotiate** different license terms; **refusing** to license anyone other than original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs); and insisting on **royalties** calculated as a **percentage** of the **sale price** of a handset sold to end users for hundreds of dollars, despite the minimal contribution of any particular patent to the retail value.

In 2017, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission [sued](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductor-device-used) Qualcomm for violating both sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act by engaging in a number of anticompetitive SEP licensing practices. In May 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California agreed with the FTC, identifying numerous instances of Qualcomm’s unlawful, anticompetitive conduct in a comprehensive [233-page opinion](https://www.eff.org/document/ftc-v-qualcomm-district-court-opinion). We were pleased to see the FTC take action and the district court credit the overwhelming evidence that Qualcomm’s conduct is corrosive to market-based competition and threatens to cement Qualcomm’s dominance for years to come.

But this month, a panel of judges from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously [overturned](https://www.eff.org/document/ninth-circuit-opinion-ftc-v-qualcomm) the district court’s decision, reasoning that Qualcomm’s conduct was “hypercompetitive” but not “anticompetitive,” and therefore not a violation of antitrust law. To reach that result, the Ninth Circuit made the patent grant more powerful and antitrust law weaker than ever.

According to the Ninth Circuit, patent owners don’t have a duty to let anyone use what their patent covers, and therefore Qualcomm had no duty to license its SEPs to anyone. But that framing requires **ignoring** the **promises** Qualcomm made to license its SEPs on **reasonable** and **non-discriminatory** terms—promises that courts in this country and around the world have **consistently** enforced. It also means ignoring antitrust principles like the essential facilities doctrine, which limits the ability of a monopolist with **hold-up power** over an **essential facility** (like a port) to **shut out** rivals. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held rather simplistically that a duty to deal could arise only if the monopolist had provided access, and then reversed its policy.

But even when Qualcomm restricted its licensing policies in critical ways, the Ninth Circuit found reasons to approve those restrictions. For example, Qualcomm stopped licensing its patents to chip manufacturers and started licensing them only to OEMs. This had a major benefit: it let Qualcomm charge a much **higher royalty rate** based on the **high retail price** of the end user devices, like smartphones and tablets, that OEMs make and sell. If Qualcomm had continued to license to chip suppliers, its patents would be “**exhausted**” once the chips were sold to OEMs, extinguishing Qualcomm’s right to assert its patents and control how the chips were used.

Patent exhaustion is a century-old doctrine that protects the rights of consumers to use things they buy without getting the patent owner’s permission again and again. Patent exhaustion is important because it **prevents price-gouging**, but also because it protects **space** for **innovation** by letting people **use things** they buy **freely**, including to build innovations of their own. The doctrine thus helps patent law serve its underlying goal—promoting economic **growth** and **innovation**. In other words, the doctrine of exhaustion is baked into the patent grant; it is not optional. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit wholeheartedly approved of Qualcomm’s efforts to avoid **exhaustion**—even when that meant **cutting off** access to **previous licensees** (chip-makers) in ways that let Qualcomm charge **far more** in **licensing fees** than its SEPs **could possibly** have **contributed** to the **retail value** of the **final product**.

It makes **no sense** that Qualcomm could **contract around** a fundamental principle like patent **exhaustion**, but at the same time **did not assume** any **antitrust duty** to deal under these circumstances. Worse, it’s **harmful** for the **economy**, **innovation**, and **consumers**. Unfortunately, the kind of harm that antitrust law recognizes is limited to harm affecting “competition” or the “competitive process.” Antitrust law, at least as the Ninth Circuit interprets it, doesn’t do nearly enough to address the **harm** downstream consumers experience when they pay **inflated** prices for high-tech devices, and miss out on **innovation** that might have developed from fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing practices.

We hope the FTC sticks to its guns and asks the Ninth Circuit to go en banc and reconsider this decision. Otherwise, antitrust law will become an even **weaker weapon** against **innovation-stifling conduct** in **technology markets.**

**Weakened antitrust enforcement emboldens firms to follow Qualcomm’s lead, which collapses FRAND integrity.**

**Hovenkamp 20**, \*Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship>)

While the FRAND process has been highly productive, it is also **fragile**. Firms are tempted to make commitments at the beginning when the incentive to join is large, but **renege** on them **later** when they can profit by doing so. At least in this particular case, private FRAND enforcement **had not worked** very well. Qualcomm had been able to violate FRAND commitments in order to **exclude rivals** and obtain **higher royalties** than FRAND would permit, largely with **impunity**. Other firms will very likely **follow Qualcomm’s lead**. If that happens the **FRAND system** will **fall apart**, doing **irreparable injury** to the modern wireless telecommunications network or, at the very least, **diminishing** the **leadership role** of the United States in preserving effective **network competition**.

While governments can be heavily involved in standard set-ting,9 the implementation of technical standards in information technologies is largely the work of private actors. Government involvement is limited mainly to enforcement of contract, intellectual property, or antitrust law. As private actors, those involved in standard setting or compliance are fully subject to the federal antitrust laws.

This Article addresses one question: when is an SSO participant’s violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if it is, of what kind and what are the implications for remedies? It warns against two extremes. One is thinking that any violation of a FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation as well. In the first instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate any antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation. The question of an antitrust violation does not de-pend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement but rather on whether it caused competitive harm. This can happen because the conduct restrained trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, was unreasonably exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act, or amounted to an anticompetitive condition or understanding as defined by section 3 of the Clay-ton Act.10 The end goal is to identify practices that harm com-petition, thereby injuring consumers.

The Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision will make antitrust violations in the context of FRAND licensing much more **difficult to prove**, even in cases where **anticompetitive behavior** and consumer harm **seem clear**.11 Indeed, in this case the court itself acknowledged the harm to consumers but appeared to think that they were not entitled to protection.12 If this decision stands, FRAND obligations will to a **larger extent** have to be settled through private litigation and the federal antitrust enforcement agencies will have a **diminished role**. Anticompetitive behavior by one firm that is **not effectively disciplined** will lead **others** to do the **same thing**.

**A trusted and credible system for ICT innovation is critical to rapid tech diffusion and economic growth---absent FRAND, the system will collapse.**

**Bauer et al. 17**, \*Matthias Bauer is Senior Economist at ECIPE; \*Fredrik Erixon is a Swedish economist and writer. He has been the Director of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) ever since its start in 2006; (October 2017, “Standard Essential Patents and the Quest for Faster Diffusion of Technology”, https://ecipe.org/publications/standard-essential-patents/)

It is easy to take a **pessimistic view** about whether the system will **break**. If the current trend continues, the system is **likely** to break at **some point** for the simple reason that companies will **not trust it** anymore. The series of legal disputes witnessed over the past years – sometimes referred to as the “smartphone patent wars” – has been fodder for a pessimistic reading of “the two tales of SEPs”. While it is common in the business world that disputes over patents and licenses are settled in courts, various SEP disputes have revealed **problematic** aspects of the SEP market that are different from those disputes that follow the normal stream of business and contracts. Often, the SEP disputes are less concerned about the rights and boundaries of patents, and more about **antitrust limits** to market **behavior**: they concern market **abusive practices** and **restrictions** to **competition** as much as they are about intellectual property.

If the SEP system actually **does break** at some point, the consequences would be **felt** throughout the **economy**. SEPs have been a **critical part** of the ICT revolution. SEPs have allowed for the **fast rates** of innovation **diffusion** that the world has witnessed over the **past quarter** of a **century**. All the computer and Internet related products and services that people are now dependent upon for their private and professional lives are **intricate webs** of intellectual property. As many as 250,000 patents can be used to claim ownership of some technical specification or design element in a single smartphone (NYT 2012). A laptop, suggests one calculation, implements more than 250 interoperability standards (Biddle et al. 2010), and the number of SEP holders for 3G and 4G standards grew from 2 in 1994 to 130 in 2013 while the number of SEPs rose from fewer than 150 in 1994 to more than 150,000 in 2013 (Galetovic and Gupta 2016). The standardization-body ETSI has registered more than 150,000 declarations of SEPs from companies, and ETSI is just one of many bodies in the world of ICT standardization. For the 3G standard, the same body has about 24,000 patents that have been declared essential. Now, with the economy yet again on the **threshold** of big technological change, a **trusted** and **credible system** for creators and users of technology to standardize proprietary technology would be a boon for **innovation**, **interoperability** and – ultimately – the **consumers**.

And there are reasons for optimism. Although many of the problems in the SEP regimes need to be addressed, the numbers above indicate that the SEP system is in fact attractive to patent holders and SEP implementers. It is easy to see why: neither holders nor implementers are presented with alternative options that on the face of it would be far more profitable for them. In other words, there simply would not be as many patents declared as essential if both creators and users of technology believed the SEP system worked to their disadvantage or was grossly unfair. While the reality for some companies may be that legal disputes and unpredictability prompt them to find other ways than SEPs to get access to key technologies for their products, it remains the case that most stakeholders have strong economic incentives to maintain a balanced SEP system that is trusted.

First, standard essential patents are an asset for creators of technology because, by becoming **essential** to a standard, their volumes of sales for technologies that users value rise **significantly**. As many holders want to raise more revenues for their SEPs and – ideally – have the freedom to contract with buyers on their terms, they can expand their customer base when they agree to sell patented technology in accordance with a set of rules that are designed to prevent SEP holders exploiting the weakness of a customer that has grown dependent on having access to their technology.

Second, SEPs are hugely **beneficial** also to those that buy the licenses – the implementers or users. Through the SEP system, they can access technologies that are **interoperable** and work with different **products** and **functionalities** – and they can do it under conditions that, if history is a guide, in most cases give them stable and predictable terms of contract. As a consequence, both creators and users can focus on their competitive advantages and profit on the economies of scale and specialization. Downstream firms do not need to develop their own upstream technology and upstream firms do not need to package their technologies in end-customer products in order to make their products valuable.

Third, standard-setting organisations (SSOs) also have a big stake in an SEP system that works well – and, like creators and users of technology, they would stand to lose significantly if the SEP system were to collapse.

Lastly, the biggest beneficiaries are individual consumers – those who buy the end products using FRAND-conditioned SEPs. The advent of SEPs and the rules represented by FRAND have enabled a **development** of fast technology creation and contributed to the **rapid diffusion** in ICT goods and ICT-based services. The SEP system has also allowed for new competition, both between existing technologies and brands, and from new ones that have stepped into the market with the ambition to disrupt it, again to the benefit of the consumer. It is **difficult** to imagine that the ICT and digital **development** would have been as **fast** as it has been if SEPs had not been a **central feature** of the **market**.

The changing fortunes of companies operating in the cellular and smartphone market would not have been possible if there had not been an SEP system that supported competition. Now that the **world economy** is on the **doorstep** of new innovations that are dependent on a great number of input technologies – e.g. the Internet-of-Things, transport connectivity and intelligent vehicles – it is **crucially important** for the consumer that a **balanced** and **functioning** SEP system is maintained and that actors in the system **converge** towards it – which would ultimately **meet** their **economic interests**.

**ICT innovation is key to post-COVID economic recovery and long-term growth.**

**van Ark 21**, \*Bart van Ark is a Senior Advisor of the Economy, Strategy and Finance (ESF) Center at The Conference Board; Bart van Ark, \*Klaas de Vries is an economist with The Conference Board; \*Abdul Erumban is an assistant professor at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands and a senior research fellow at The Conference Board; (2021, “HOW TO NOT MISS A PRODUCTIVITY REVIVAL ONCE AGAIN”, https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/nie.2020.49)

Introduction

As the global economy has entered recession in 2020, triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, the human casualties, and economic **damage** are perceived to be **very large**. Even as the health crisis will gradually become manageable, the impact on economic growth can be **long-lasting** and the recovery path can take several **years**. In particular, growth drivers such as the pace of job creation, income generation and investment may take several years to get back to pre-crisis trends. Initially the productivity of those growth drivers may be of less concern as the mantra of ‘we’ll do what it takes to avoid worse’ is predominant in this phase of the crisis.

However, once the recovery gets underway the **productive** use of **resources** is key to **sustained** growth. While we do not ignore the short-term challenges of the economic recovery, our primary focus in this paper is on the productivity puzzle from a **long-term** perspective. Productivity is driven by technological **change** and **innovation** which, in turn, depends on **investment** in human and physical capital as well as in other ‘missing capitals’ often referred to as intangible assets. Indeed, those investments create a **positive feedback** effect, as the productivity it generates also helps to make more **efficient** usage of **scarce** resources in the future. When properly measured and valued, productivity also provides a critical yardstick to realise a fairer distribution of the gains from economic growth to those who bring the resources to bear. It thereby creates the incentives for people to produce and business to invest helping to drive economic growth and raise living standards.

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, many economies around the world, especially advanced economies, have failed to recharge the economy by powering productivity as the key source of growth in the long term. Indeed the latest update of The Conference Board Total Economy Database (July 2020) points at significant weakening in labor productivity growth in Europe up to 2019 (figure 1a–c). While the United States experienced somewhat faster productivity growth from 2017 to 2019 than the Euro Area and the United Kingdom, it still has **not recovered** to the rates of productivity growth from before the global financial crisis either.

The slowdown in productivity growth over the past 15 years has been well documented. There are multiple causes including an exhaustion of catch-up potential in emerging markets impacting economies along entire global value chains, and the drag from the global financial crisis because of low demand and weak investment, too low interest rates causing misallocations an overreliance on cheap labor, and failing fiscal policies (Bauer et al., 2020; Cette et al., 2016; Crafts, 2018; Dieppe, 2020; Fernald et al., 2017; Syverson, 2016).1 Technical measurement issues regarding inputs and outputs may have played a role as well.

In our earlier work we have stressed the importance of time lags in the adoption of new technologies, and in particular the complexity in generating productivity growth from the latest round of new digital technologies since the early 2010s, including the move toward mobile, ubiquitous access to broadband, the rise of cloud storage and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics (van Ark, 2016a, 2016b; van Ark and O’Mahony, 2016; van Ark et al., 2016).

While the first priority for economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is to restore jobs, it is important that any employment-intensive growth path does go together with a **productivity revival**. In this paper, we argue that it is possible to avoid another productivity **slowdown**. Underneath the aggregate figures, there is evidence pointing toward a possible **tipping point** at which many advanced economies may expect to see more **widespread** impacts from the adoption and absorption of **digital technology** on **productivity** and GDP **growth**.

In Section 2 we review the latest literature on the productivity impacts of general purpose technologies (GPTs), including the notion of time lapses through which digital technologies result in faster productivity growth. We also look at patterns by which innovation and productivity effects GPTs emerge across industries and disperse across the economy. We explain why the New Digital Economy (NDE) is especially characterised by long lag effects.

In Section 3 we provide an empirical analysis of productivity growth by industry data to observe whether we can detect a distinct pattern across groups of industries pointing to a structural improvement in recent years. We use a taxonomy on digital intensity by industry which was recently developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Calvino et al., 2018), showing that the most digital-intensive industries have experienced a relatively strong performance in terms of labor productivity growth since 2007 and especially since 2013.

In Section 4 of the paper, we discuss the connection between labor and skills in the digital economy, which we believe provides the key to a productivity revival. We developed a new metric on innovation competencies by occupation on the basis of data from the O\*Net database on occupation-specific descriptors in the United States (Hao et al., 2018). When applied to the United Kingdom, we find that innovation competencies point at stronger productivity effects by industry.

In Section 5 we focus on how productivity has been behaving in the short-term during the COVID-19 recession. In particular, we address the potential trade-offs between traditional pro-cyclical recovery effects and scarring effects the recession leaves, especially on the labor market. We argue that increased adoption and usage of digital technologies during the COVID-19 crisis may create a positive productivity effect. In the final section, Section 6, we will review our hypothesis that a productivity revival could be imminent in the light of the recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. In order **not to miss** this **opportunity** again, as happened a decade ago, we argue that a coordinated effort from business and policy is needed, and has to be delivered in such a way that the gains from productivity will be more **widespread** and such that those who provide the resources for growth are incentivised to deliver them in an efficient way.

2. The productivity paradox of the New Digital Economy

It is well known that General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), defined as new methods of producing and inventing new goods and services which are important enough to have a long-term aggregate impact on the economy, can take a significant amount of time to translate to faster **productivity** growth at the **aggregate level** of the economy. This is inherent to the three critical characteristics of a GPT as identified by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).2

1. Pervasiveness –The GPT should spread to most sectors.

2. Improvement –The GPT should get better over time and, hence, should keep lowering the costs of its users.

3. Innovation spawning –The GPT should make it easier to invent and produce new products or processes.

Historical analysis has focussed on productivity trends in previous technology phases (Bakker et al., 2019; Crafts, 2004). Recent literature has shown that the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution of the past 50 years can be characterised as a GPT and doesn’t pale with previous GPTs such as steam technology, electricity and the combustion engine. For example, Hempell (2005) concludes that ‘investment in information and communication technologies (ICT) are **closely linked** to **complementary** innovations and are most **productive** in firms with experience from earlier innovations’. In a more recent analysis of the evolution of the Internet, Simcoe (2015) argues that the modularity of the internet has prevented a **fall** in **return** to **investments** in **innovation** by ‘facilitating low-cost **adaptation** of a shared general-purpose technology to the demands of heterogeneous applications’. In a review of the data, Liao et al. (2016) conclude that:

‘...ICT investment does **contribute** to **productivity** but not in the usual manner –we find a positive (but lagged) ICT effect on technological progress. We argue that for a positive ICT role on growth to actually take place, a period of negative relationship between productivity and ICT investment together with ICT-using sectors’ capacity to learn from the embodied new technology was crucial. In addition, it took a learning period with appropriate complementary co-inventions for the new ICT-capital to become effective and its gains to be realised. Our findings provide **solid**, further **empirical evidence** to support ICT as a general purpose technology’.

**Growth solves nuclear war.**

**Henricksen 17**, \*Thomas H., emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; (March 23rd, 2017, “Post-American World Order,” Hoover Institution, <http://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order>)

What Is To Be Done?

The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in  “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union.

What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and **economically strong**, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ **hawkish behavior** that might otherwise trigger a **major conflict**. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic **chess match** with Russia and China will prove **tense** and **demanding**—since all the countries boast **nuclear arms** and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously.

There can be **little room** for **error** in **fraught crises** among **nuclear-weaponized** and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a **waiting game** in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a **collapse**, as happened to the Soviet Union.

Some Chinese and Russian experts predict grave domestic problems for each other. They also entertain **similar** thoughts about the United States, which they view as terminally decadent and catastrophically polarized over politics, ethnicity, and the future direction of the country. So, the brewing three-way struggle also involves a **systemic contest**, which will test the competitors’ **economic** and **political institutions**.

At this juncture, the world is entering a standoff among the three great and several not-so-great powers. Averting war, while defending our interests, will prove a challenge, calling for deft policy, political endurance, and **economic growth**, as well as sufficient military force to **keep at bay** aggressive states or **prevail** over them if ever a war breaks out.

**Emergence of smart cities depends on IoT applications of 5G interoperability standards---absent FRAND, excessive royalties will undermine sustainable development.**

**Schwartz 18**, \*Matt Schwartz, Privacy Fellowship Coordinator at ACT, App Association; (March 2nd, 2018, “It’s Smart to be FRANDly: How the FRAND Commitment Will Determine the Future of Smart Cities”, https://actonline.org/2018/03/02/its-smart-to-be-frandly-how-the-frand-commitment-will-determine-the-future-of-smart-cities/)

In December, we [outlined](https://actonline.org/2017/12/18/smart-cities-connecting-your-community-through-technology/%5d) the emergence of **Smart Cities** – cities that harness technological **innovations** like internet of things (**IoT**) devices and data analytics to improve essential infrastructure in growing urban centers. The technological foundation of Smart Cities aims to improve public safety, better allocate resources, and meet the needs of citizens more quickly.

A central element to Smart Cities is the comprehensive network of sensors and devices implemented within buildings, roads, traffic signs, and parking meters that allows them to interact with public, and potentially private-owned, infrastructure. These sensors will “speak” to one another, communicating information about energy usage, traffic density, or other elements of city management that have traditionally either been analyzed separately or not tracked at all. The potential of Smart Cities allows data to flow from previously disconnected branches of the city and be processed in real-time, unlocking previously unknown insights.

The powerful **interoperability** of Smart Cities will rely heavily on **standardized technologies** developed in organizations like the IEEE, which is responsible for standardizing the wi-fi technology we use every day. Standardized technologies often include standard-essential patents (**SEPs**), which, like their name suggests, are patents declared essential to an industry standard by a standards-setting organization. In simple terms, one cannot implement the standardized technology without using the patent.

Like regular patents, the users of SEPs must pay royalties or **licensing fees** to the patent owner before they may use it. For example, if a manufacturing company wants to make an IoT device interoperable with a 5G network, the manufacturer must pay a licensing fee to the owner of the SEP that is essential to the 5G standard. SEPs play a **vital role** in the new innovations we enjoy and have come to expect, and because of the value of these patents, SEP holders have the ability to demand **high license fees** from those who wish to implement the standard. To offset this **competition issue**, many SEP holders **voluntarily** agree to license their SEPs to any willing licensee under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (**FRAND**) terms.

While wi-fi and LTE are standards that will be vital to Smart City deployment, countless new standardized technologies are being developed that will be integral to any fully-operational Smart City. With **reasonable access** to SEPs, assured by the FRAND commitment, innovators can enjoy the **legal** and **business certainty** they need to **compete**. While the meaning of the FRAND commitment continues to be refined – as evidenced by the development of SEP best practices recently launched by the App Association in Europe – its foundations are well-established.

But what happens when SEP holders do not abide by the FRAND licensing commitment, or simply refuse to license at all? Sadly, small and medium-sized companies would be **forced** to accept **untenable** licensing terms, but more realistically, they would be **priced out** of using the standard **altogether**. As a result, it would impose a **barrier** to **innovation** that would result in **fewer products** offered to consumers or cities eager to implement **IoT technologies**. For example, many hope the rise of autonomous vehicles will be seamlessly integrated into the Smart City network. But how beneficial would it be if only some autonomous vehicle brands are able to license the technology needed to communicate with traffic lights, simply because of the market power of a chipmaker? The FRAND commitment is an important backstop to that unfortunate possibility.

It is vital for SEP holders to honor FRAND licensing terms, if not for small and medium-sized innovators, then for the sustainability of future Smart Cities. FRAND creates a platform for innovation, providing a floor on which companies can stand, innovate, and compete. If the foundation of the FRAND commitment is reneged, American innovators pay a **steep price** – not only do they lose a **key component** of product **development** and **market entry**, but they are also left with years of expensive negotiations and litigation if they choose to challenge the licensing practice. What’s more, the **confidence** developed in the open standards development system is **shaken**, and Smart Cities have fewer choices in IoT solutions for their future.

To achieve the promise of Smart Cities, a balanced standards ecosystem is essential. We must allow small and medium-sized developers to **leverage industry standards** for innovation and prevent cost-prohibitive royalty structures and negotiating practices that are **detrimental** to **competition**, while also ensuring that SEP owners can protect their intellectual property and be fairly compensated for its use. The FRAND commitment continues to be the **best framework** to achieve this balance, and **adherence** to its **principles** will determine the **future** and **success** of **Smart Cities**.

**Climate change is anthropogenic and causes extinction---5G-enabled smart cities are critical for mitigation and adaptation.**

**Huseien 21**, \*Ghasan Fahim Huseien is a research fellow at Department of Building, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, Singapore; Dr. Kwok Wei Shah is presently an assistant professor and deputy program director with the Department of Building, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, Singapore; (August 23rd, 2021, “Potential Applications of 5G Network Technology for Climate Change Control: A Scoping Review of Singapore”, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/17/9720)

Currently, the **entire planet** is at risk due to continual **climate change** [1–3]. The recorded increase in average temperature across the world in the past hundred years, and the associated changes attributed to this, are known as global warming. Many scientists are convinced by the published evidence that this change is **anthropogenic** and resulted from the **elevated emission levels** of global greenhouse gases (GHGs) [4,5]. Gases such as water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone are responsible for the absorption and emission of thermal radiation. These changes in the relative quantities of the GHGs induce a proportional change in the amount of preserved solar energy. Presently, the accepted indicator for global warming is the sustained rise in the mean temperature worldwide. This definition is designed to account for the fact that there may be some localized exceptions to this rise. For example, there may be cooling experienced in a region while the global temperature may increase altogether, hence the need for average temperature. A key concern with the GHGs trapping of more heat in the atmosphere is that it affects both climate and short scale weather patterns. Consequently, it results in **greater numbers** of **adverse weather events** such as storms, heat waves, cold snaps, droughts, and fires [6]. **Climate-related risks** to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human safety, and economic growth are projected to **increase** with global warming of 1.5 ◦C [7] and further increase further at 2 ◦C, as shown in Figure 1. In addition, the risks to global aggregated economic growth due to the climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5 ◦C than at 2 ◦C by the end of this century.

Carbon dioxide has the most **substantial effect** on global warming [8]. Although it was once assumed to have an ~100 year lifespan in the atmosphere, careful studies revealed that the situation is far worse, with three-quarters of the gas expected to remain for a time in the region of up to ~1000 years, with the remainder lasting for an indefinite period of time [9]. It was indicated that the present impacts of humanity on the atmosphere can certainly cause a long term problem [10]. Carbon dioxide is released when oil, coal, and other fossil fuels are burnt for the energy we use to power our homes, cars, and smartphones. By **lessening** its **usage**, we can **curb** our own **contribution** to climate change while saving money. The first challenge is eliminating the burning of coal, oil, and, eventually, natural gas. Oil is the lubricant of the global economy as it is hidden inside such ubiquitous items as plastic and corn, fundamental to the transportation of both consumers and goods. Coal is the substrate, supplying roughly half of the electricity worldwide, a percentage that is likely to grow according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). In fact, buildings contribute up to 43% of all the greenhouse gas emissions worldwide [11], even though investing in thicker insulation and other cost-effective as well as temperature-regulating strategies can save money in the long run. Investment in **new infrastructures**, or radical **upgradation** of the existing highways and transmission lines, may help to **reduce** greenhouse gas **emissions**, yielding economic growth in the developing countries.

Nations across the globe have kept very **high targets** to reducing their GHG discharges [12,13]. In order to meet these goals, **considerable reductions** in city energy usage is required. At a global scale, urban communities represent over half (55%) of the population, which is predicted to reach **68%** by the middle of this century [14]. Urban areas claim ownership of the **highest levels** of energy use, gas emission, and also the largest local economy. As such, it is **crucial** for urban areas to **reduce** their **consumption** and utilize **renewable sources** wherever available to reduce their gas discharge levels. Smart cities often utilize **digital sensors** to measure and transmit data about the levels of GHGs in the city at that moment, as a means of tackling them [15]. The **efficacy** of such a system is thus **reliant** on the network used to collate and analyze the data collected as an extant network. The mobile telecommunications networks offer a **convenient solution** to this desire, as their pre-existence has the clear benefit of reducing costs compared to the design and implementation of a novel system. It is recognized that smart cities will certainly act as the key players meeting these ambitious targets [16,17]. In this study, we focused primarily on the potential applications of 5G network technology to control climate change in Singapore. In addition, a **clear overview** of the **sustainability benefits** of introducing **5G** technology **compatible** smart cities, buildings, and farms in all aspects of urbanization is provided. Herein, the main purpose is to tackle the **negative outcomes** associated with **anthropogenic climate change**, with a particular focus on the contributions that are best made by the telecoms network operators.

Climate change is one of the most **challenging problems** that humanity has ever faced. Presently, hundreds of millions of lives, innumerable species, entire ecosystems, health, economy, and the **future habitability of this planet** are at risk. Fortunately, climate change is **solvable**, we just need to **wisely exploit** the **existing technologies** and **sciences**. Climate change mitigation is a pressing international need in which many management actions are required. The development of 5G technology has been largely driven by smart mobile devices and advanced communication technologies. It may thus serve as a **technical enabler** for a whole new range of business opportunities, energy, and facilities management, together with industrial applications. Moreover, it may enable different devices to work together seamlessly. Definitely, the 5G cellular network technology is expected to **revolutionize** the **global industries** with **profound effects** on the savings of energy, waste generation and recycling, and water resources management, thus **reducing** the **climate change impacts**.

**1AC — Cybersecurity**

**Advantage 2 is Cybersecurity —**

**Aggressive patent strategies create structural flaws in 5G standardization that imperils domestic cybersecurity---market competition reduces the incidence of vulnerability and severity of attacks.**

**Duan 20**, \*Charles Duan is a senior fellow and associate director of tech & innovation policy at the R Street Institute, where he focuses his research on intellectual property issues; (2020, “OF MONOPOLIES AND MONOCULTURES: THE INTERSECTION OF PATENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY”, Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal, 36(4), 369-405. Retrieved from <https://www2.lib.ku.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/monopolies-monocultures-intersection-patents/docview/2442966690/se-2?accountid=14556>)

III. COMPETITION AND CYBERSECURITY

In addition to the historical review done so far, another approach to understanding the relationship among patents, competition, and national security is to consider the role of **cybersecurity**. There is little doubt that computer system vulnerabilities that enable **hacking** and **spread** of **computer exploits** are a **threat** to the **nation’s defenses**, so better cybersecurity is a **key part** of national security strategy.155

**Strong competition** can thus **complement** national security by enhancing domestic cybersecurity, and **patent assertion** that **unduly weakens** competition **detracts** from cybersecurity.156 Competition promotes better cybersecurity in at least two ways. First, multiple studies show that competition encourages firms to improve their products on multiple vectors including cybersecurity. Second, competition avoids a situation that security experts call a “monoculture,” which increases vulnerability to severe cyberattacks. As former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff wrote recently, “We need **competition** and **multiple providers**, not a potentially vulnerable technological monoculture,” to **guarantee** national security.157 Thus, cybersecurity provides a **useful lens** for understanding how **unfettered** patent assertion and **licensing** can **detract** from **national security**.

A. Cybersecurity as Competitive Value-Add

Competition enhances national security by **reducing** the **incidence** of technical **vulnerabilities**. That effect is **especially important** for security **sensitive systems** such as **mobile telecommunications**.

Intuitively, a **causal chain** from **competition** to **cybersecurity** makes logical sense. Computer security is a value-added benefit to consumers, so firms in competitive markets are likely to use security to gain an edge over their competitors.158 In monopolized markets, though, there may be less **external impetus** to **test products** for flaws, and the **monopolist** may **choose** to **focus less** on **security** and more on new product features or increased product quality.

Economic research confirms these hypotheses about competition leading to better cybersecurity. A 2009 empirical study of web browsers considered the impact of market concentration on the amount of time that vendors took to fix security vulnerabilities as they were discovered.159 The study found that the **presence** of more **competitors** correlated with **faster cybersecurity** response—a reduction of 8–10 days in response time per additional market rival.160 Similarly, business researchers in 2005 modeled incentives for firms to engage in sharing of cybersecurity information, and concluded that the “**inclination** to **share information** and **invest** in **security technologies** increases as the **degree** of **competitiveness** in an industry increases.”161 Another study found that, where two software firms are in competition, at least one will be willing to take on **some degree** of **risk** and **responsibility** for cybersecurity, whereas a monopoly software firm will **consistently fail** to accept such responsibility.162 To be sure, an unpublished study from 2017 found that some market concentration can make firms more responsive to cybersecurity issues, but only to a point: “being in a dominant position reduces the positive effect of having less competitors on the responsiveness of the vendor,” and indeed the “more dominant the firm is, the less rapid it is in releasing security patches.”163 This research confirms that competition is more conducive to cybersecurity.

It is not hard to see how this applies to emerging communication technologies markets. In the absence of competition, the above research suggests that device manufacturers, chip makers, and software developers will **lack incentives** to **respond** to **vulnerabilities**, to **share information** about cybersecurity practices and issues, and to **take responsibility** for security matters. Mobile phone chips have had their share of cybersecurity failures already.164 **The best way to flush out ongoing and future cybersecurity issues is to maintain competitive pressure at all levels of the supply chain.**

B. Vulnerabilities of “Monocultures”

A second reason why monopoly undermines cybersecurity is that monopoly leads to a “**monoculture**” of single-vendor products, opening the door to **massive** systemic **failure** in the case of a **cyberattack**. Computer researchers developed the theory of software monocultures in the early 2000s, in response to the regular phenomenon of computer viruses and other attacks spreading rapidly by exploiting flaws in the dominant operating system at the time, Microsoft Windows.165 Where a computer system such as Windows has a commanding share of users, a virus that **exploits** a **flaw** in that system can quickly **spread** to **infect** a whole **interconnected ecosystem**. An operating system monopoly thus enables fast and easy spread of cyberattacks, and better cybersecurity would be achieved through greater diversity in online systems.166 As one research group posited, “a network architecture that **supports** a collection of **heterogeneous network** elements for the same **functional capability** offers a **greater possibility** of **surviving** security **attacks** as compared to **homogeneous networks**.”167

There has been considerable study of the theory that computer monocultures are **naturally** more **vulnerable** to attacks.168 In one study, computer science researchers reviewed a catalog of 6,340 software vulnerabilities recorded in 2007, to compare whether comparable software would share the same flaws.169 Of the 2,627 vulnerabilities applicable to application software (as opposed to operating systems, web scripts, and other software components), only 29 (1.1%) applied to substitute products from different vendors but providing the same functionality.170 By contrast, different versions of a single software product were found to share vulnerabilities 84.7% of the time.171 Thus, software monocultures share **exploitable flaws** even when there is some **variation** in **versions** across the **monoculture**; by contrast, diversity in software is almost **guaranteed** to **prevent** a **single flaw** from **affecting** all **users**.

In the case of 5G and wireless mobile communications, a monoculture is an **especially concerning** possibility. To the extent that systems such as smart city sensors or communication networks are **widely deployed** in a monoculture fashion, a **widespread attack** could have **devastating** consequences, potentially blacking out a region and affecting essential services such as 911.172 A monoculture that is vulnerable to so-called “**rootkits**” or “**backdoors**”—maliciously installed software that enable **bad actors** to commandeer systems—could also enable **mass surveillance** or **spying** by private hackers or foreign governments.173 The presence of systems from **multiple vendors** would mitigate these possibilities.

The monoculture theory is not without critics, but a review of those criticisms shows them to be inapplicable to contemporary communication technologies. Some critics suggest that software diversity imposes **unwarranted costs** on firms who must **forego** economies of scale and devise seemingly duplicative yet different setups of computer systems.174 But those concerns **largely focus** on the situation where a **single firm** produces and manages heterogeneous systems, concerns that are **avoided** where **heterogeneity** arises **naturally** through **competition** between two **unrelated** firms. Critics also argue that technological measures can create “artificial diversity” through automated randomization of software code, so software engineers can purportedly solve monoculture issues and device users need not worry about the issue.175 But even these critics acknowledge that artificial diversity techniques are often **insufficient** because they must make **assumptions** about what **aspects** of the **technology** are **most vulnerable** to **attack**, and they **concede** that artificial diversity **cannot stop** attacks involving operation of **legitimate** software functions in **undesirable** ways (sending spam emails or deleting document files, for example).176

It is widely recognized that a monoculture is **unavoidable** in at least one respect: Most connected devices will need to **conform** to technical **standards**.177 5G, for example, is a technical standard developed by a private industry consortium called 3GPP.178 A **flaw** in any such standard would render **all mobile devices** implementing the standard **vulnerable** to an **identical attack**.179 Avoiding these sorts of **systemic flaws** in standards requires rigorous **development**, **analysis**, and **testing** of the standard in the development process, which in turn requires ensuring that **as many firms** as **possible**, especially firms that share basic American values, are **involved** in the **development** of those **standards**.180 Thus, the necessary **standardization** of **information** and **communication technologies** is perhaps the most **important reason** why a **competitive** communication technology **market** is **essential** to **cybersecurity** and national security.

**Insecure technical standards cause inevitable systemic grid collapse---extinction.**

**DeNardis 21**, \*Dr. Laura DeNardis, PhD in Science and Technology Studies from Virginia Tech, Dean of the School of Communication at American University, and Gordon M. Goldstein, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, (March 1st, 2021, “The Real Lesson of the Texas Power Debacle”, Lawfare, 3/1/2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/real-lesson-texas-power-debacle)

The infrastructure was essential, ubiquitous and providing basic functionality for everything in daily life from water to heat and transportation. And in an instant it was gone, plunging tens of thousands of residents into a life-threatening crisis. This is, of course, the narrative of the recent debacle in Texas, where a winter storm overwhelmed the state’s electrical grid and brought the state to a near-total blackout. But it should also be interpreted as a preemptive **warning** of what Americans will face from the next generation of the **internet** and the new realm of cybersecurity risk it will **dramatically** amplify.

Both forms of infrastructure—a state-run electrical grid and the **5G** and “**internet of things**” future to which we are rapidly hurtling—share three attributes. First, their construction reflects a lack of imagination about the danger that can quickly **coalesce** when seemingly remote threat scenarios become real. Second, compounding a lack of analytic imagination is an absence of preparedness. Third, for both the Texas electrical grid and the emerging internet, public policy protections are either meager or completely absent.

In planning for the resilience of its electrical grid, public officials in Texas **discounted** the potentially devastating disruption that could occur from **unpredictable** events—whether related to climate change or just a once-a-century anomaly. They also eschewed precautions other states take seriously by allowing for the interconnection of electrical grid supply chains across their borders, ostensibly because of their ideological rejection of federal regulatory oversight governing such arrangements.

As the United States builds out a new national **5G** cyber-physical communications network through private service providers, Americans similarly **discount** the **risks**—myriad in their diversity and severity—that are **orders** of **magnitude** more **significant** than what Texas confronted recently. More physical things than people are already connected. The super empowered internet of tomorrow, known among some in the field as the “internet of everything,” will exceed by **tens of billions** of devices the number of connections between individuals simply communicating via social media or digital screens.

This confronts policymakers with an imminent threat: A cyber outage is **no longer** about losing digital communications but about losing basic **societal functioning** and even **human life**. The failure of imagination is to think of the SolarWinds attack on U.S. federal agencies and tech companies as a **worst-case scenario**. The failure of imagination is to think of cybersecurity through a content-centric lens rather than as possible attacks on the material world. The emergence of internet-connected cardiac devices, digitally dependent cars, and internet-connected agriculture systems portend the stakes of a cyberattack to **health care**, economic and **social functioning**, and **food security.**

The United States should be prepared for, and certainly not be caught by surprise by, such cyberattacks. Yet, the internet of everything is notoriously **insecure**. Internet-connected physical objects are not necessarily upgradeable. Nor do they come with adequate default security and encryption. The 5G infrastructure that helps connect digital objects has been at the center of debates over Chinese espionage. Industrial cyber-physical **systems** are based on **technical standards** that have not been collaboratively vetted for **security** and **interoperability**. One of the most infamous cyberattacks—the so-called Mirai botnet that took down major media sites and corporations—hijacked these insecure objects in homes to carry out the assault. The United States is not yet prepared.

Finally, in the race to conceive and deploy effective public policy responses, the U.S. government as a whole is hardly more anticipatory or synthesized in its response to potential calamity than the state of Texas. The focus of U.S. cyber policy remains on information policy issues such as disinformation, manipulation and violent speech rather than securing the digital world that now powers our material day-to-day lives. The Biden administration confronts an enormous challenge in crafting a comprehensive strategy to the cybersecurity risks foreshadowed by the ruinous experience in Texas and its management of vital infrastructure. While the digital world has leapt from two-dimensional to three-dimensional space, cyber policy has not at all jumped from 2D to 3D.

This failure of imagination, preparedness and policy protection must not be America’s cyber future; the stakes are far **too high** and the costs are far **too great.** The Texas disaster is a potent illustration of what has always been true: Our digital society and economy are extremely vulnerable and grow more porous and subject to penetration day by day. As digital sensors and cyber control systems become further embedded in physical infrastructure like energy systems, agriculture and transportation, there is no longer a separation between security of the **“real” world** and security of the **online world**. They are **entangled** and increasingly **enmeshed**—and policy has yet to catch up to either envisioning or mitigating the looming threats the U.S. confronts.

If the energy grid cannot weather a winter storm, how can it be expected to withstand a major cyberattack? What other vital forms of national infrastructure—ranging from water, bridges, highways and roads, and ultimately our day-to-day financial system—are **comparably** at **risk**? As Texas dramatizes, it is neither **hyperbolic** nor **exaggerated** to assert that **our survival** could now depend on **securing** the inevitable **cyber-physical future** that is accelerating with **stunning rapidity**.

#### Cyberwar is increasingly likely---SolarWind emboldens hackers to undermine critical infrastructure and nuclear supply chains.

Bajema 21, \*Dr. Natasha Bajema is the Director of the [Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks](https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/programs/csw/dr-natasha-bajema/) and an IEEE Spectrum contributor. She has held long-term assignments at the National Defense University, in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration; (March 24th, 2021, “Today's Cyberattacks Foreshadow Wars to Come”, https://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/aerospace/military/todays-cyberattacks-foreshadow-wars-to-come)

Cyberattacks are no longer just a matter of cybersecurity, they directly threaten a country’s national security. Cyberattacks alter the character of warfare—much like nuclear weapons once did, allowing adversaries to potentially cross enemy lines to harm large numbers of innocent civilians.

Today’s malicious actors can now seek to cause physical damage from remote locations through digital channels, wreaking devastation on a country at levels that previously would have required a kinetic attack.

On February 8, 2021, hackers breached the Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Fla. using known software vulnerabilities in an attempt to poison the local water supply with sodium hydroxide—also known as lye. They accessed the plant through its industrial control system (ICS)—a system designed to allow for remote control and supervision of the plant. Taking over the plant’s controls, hackers increased parts of the chemical, used to [adjust the acidity and remove metals from drinking water](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate-intel-chairman-florida-water-plant-cyberattack), to one hundred times over the normal level. The system used an [old version of Windows, was accessible with a shared password, and had no firewall protection against intrusions](https://techgenix.com/florida-water-treatment-facility-cyberattack/). Thankfully, [a supervisor noticed the dangerous change in time whilst working remotely](https://www.govtech.com/em/safety/Cyberattack-on-Water-Treatment-Facility-Suggests-More-to-Come.html), averting a crisis that may have caused chemical burns and blindness among those exposed to the toxic chemical.

U.S. government officials have recently expressed concerns about similar vulnerabilities across water and energy sectors and other critical infrastructure including [health, emergency services, food and agriculture, and transportation systems](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate-intel-chairman-florida-water-plant-cyberattack). The cyberattack on the water plant occurred just a week before a major winter storm led to a widespread blackout and water crisis across Texas. [More than five million](https://time.com/5939633/texas-power-outage-blackouts/) went without power and running water for several days, illustrating the fragility of such interconnected infrastructure and the physical devastation that could be caused in the event of a cyberattack targeting the grid.

Critical infrastructure is not alone in its vulnerabilities to cyberattacks with physical implications—supply chains are also at risk. For at least a span of months (if not years), hackers have [exploited vulnerabilities](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_federal_government_data_breach) in software from Microsoft, VMWare and the Texas-based company [SolarWinds](https://www.solarwinds.com/) to compromise data security in at least 200 organizations in the U.S. government and other agencies around the world.

Although the SolarWinds attack appears to be a [case of classic espionage by Russia](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands) via the U.S. supply chain, there are aspects of the attack that also illustrate the potential for achieving physical effects via digital channels. As early as [March 2020](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands), Russian hackers breached the Orion network management software designed by SolarWinds, a federal contractor, and planted malicious code likely intended to gain access to sensitive information. Evidence of malware was first detected [in December by a cybersecurity company](https://www.newsweek.com/colorado-representative-says-solarwinds-hack-could-cyber-equivalent-pearl-harbor-1555994) that also uses the Orion software. The impact of the SolarWinds cyberattack spanned [thousands of networks](https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/article/21206223/more-questions-than-answers-as-solarwinds-breach-probe-expands) at [nine federal agencies and 100 private sector companies](https://www.cyberscoop.com/solarwinds-cyber-espionage-russia-neuberger/), including the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for overseeing the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.

Although NNSA claims there was no impact to classified systems, officials found [evidence of attempted intrusion](http://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/22/nuclear-weapons-agency-congress-hacking-450184) in unclassified systems—although, according to the NNSA Public Affairs office, the system in question was used for business purposes, not for transport of nuclear weapons and materials. The agency also detected attempts to gain access to servers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory—one of three nuclear weapons labs. [NNSA immediately disconnected the software from relevant networks](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-update-cyber-incident-related-solar-winds-compromise), removing the possibility for deleterious effects. While hackers were not likely targeting the transport of nuclear weapons, the [vulnerabilities of nuclear weapons](https://www.nap.edu/read/11538/chapter/6#112) [while en-route](https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1409912) [between secure locations](https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1348_web.pdf) are well known.

The exact objectives for the SolarWinds cyberattack remain unclear, but the vast extent of its reach may demonstrate to U.S. adversaries the significant potential of cyberattacks for achieving physical ends, including the possibility of stealing nuclear weapons. However, the incident is not the first major one from which malicious actors have deduced such capabilities—[consider the lessons from the NotPetya attack in 2017](https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/it/notpetya-latest-ransomware-is-a-warning-note-from-the-future). Russian hackers spread malicious code through a popular accounting software developed by a Ukrainian business across many countries in Europe, eventually infecting tens of thousands of computers around the world. In addition to rendering infected computers useless, the attack shut down the global operations of the Maersk shipping company and caused major traffic congestion on the roads near ports in the United States. It also slowed operations of Merck & Co, Inc., a major producer of drugs and vaccines in the U.S., [reducing production capacity for a short period of time](https://www.fiercepharma.com/manufacturing/merck-has-hardened-its-defenses-against-cyber-attacks-like-one-last-year-cost-it). Even a classic espionage or sabotage incident may carry significant potential for physical damage.

The [Biden administration has already issued guidance](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-order-on-americas-supply-chains/) for shoring up vulnerabilities in U.S. supply chains, but much more needs to be done to protect critical infrastructure and dissuade malicious actors from exploiting digital channels to achieve physical ends. In an era of hybrid and gray zone warfare, cyberattacks are attractive to nations seeking to undermine their adversaries due to challenges of attribution and the associated benefit of deniability. In the future, these nations may also come to see cyberattacks with physical effects as a new form of warfare—a Trojan horse in the form of their adversary’s own infrastructure or supply chains. In so doing, they can cross enemy lines and cause damage and destruction without defeating any military forces.

**Actors have the means and motivations to strike critical infrastructure.**

**Wintch 21**, \*Timothy M. Wintch, an active-duty Major in the United States Air Force. He is currently a graduate student at the Oettinger School of Science & Technology Intelligence, National Intelligence University, in Bethesda, Maryland. Mr. Wintch has over 11 years of experience in command-and-control operations as an Air Battle Manager. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a Master of Arts in Military Studies from American Military University. (April 20th, 2021, “PERSPECTIVE: Cyber and Physical Threats to the U.S. Power Grid and Keeping the Lights on”, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/)

Among critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S., energy is perhaps the most crucial of the 16 sectors defined by the Department of Homeland Security. This sector is **so vital** because it provides the energy necessary to run **every other** critical infrastructure sector. However, the U.S. power grid, the backbone of the energy sector, is built upon an aging skeleton that is becoming increasingly **vulnerable** every day. Whether from terrorists or nation-states like Russia and China, the power grid is susceptible to not just physical attacks, but also to **cyber** intrusion as well. However, much of this threat can be mitigated if the U.S. takes the appropriate steps to safeguard the power grid and avoid a potential catastrophe in the future.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism on U.S. soil has been at the forefront of American consciousness. Critical infrastructure provides an **appealing** target because of the disproportionally **large impact** even a **small attack** can have on the sectors. In particular, the power grid represents a particularly lucrative target, both in terms of the ease of access and the large impact it can make. The National Research Council stated that the U.S. power grid is “vulnerable to intelligent multi-site attacks by knowledgeable attackers intent on causing maximum physical damage to key components on a wide geographical scale.”[[1]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn1) Additionally, the physical security of transmission and distribution systems is difficult due to the **dispersed** nature of these key components, which in turn is advantageous to attackers as it reduces the likelihood of their capture.[[2]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn2) From 2002-2012, approximately 2,500 physical attacks occurred against transmission lines and towers worldwide and approximately 500 attacks against transformer substations.[[3]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn3) Terrorists have the **motivation** to attack the U.S. power grid but the very nature of the grid makes it highly vulnerable. The power grid is not only at risk from physical attacks, but also nation-state cyberattacks.

One nation that has shown both the **capability** and **intent** to use attacks against critical energy infrastructure is Russia, as demonstrated in their 2015 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. A Russian cyber threat group known as Sandworm, which used its BlackEnergy malware, attacked Ukrainian computer systems that provide remote control of the Ukraine power grid.[[4]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn4) This attack, and another in 2016, each left the capital Kiev without power, prompting cyber experts to raise concern about the same malware already existing in NATO and the U.S. power grids.[[5]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn5) In any conflict between Russia and NATO, not only would similar cyberattacks pose a threat, but so would potential physical attacks severing fuel oil and natural gas lines to Western Europe. Russia has both the capability and intent to attack critical infrastructure, particularly power grids, during future conflicts in their “hybrid warfare” approach.

Another nation that has the capability to attack critical energy infrastructure is China, representing a threat to not just the U.S. energy infrastructure but also that of our allies whose support would be vital in a major conflict. A recent NATO report highlighted this threat from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, stating that “[China’s] foreign direct investment in strategic sectors [such as energy generation and distribution] …raises questions about whether access and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly in crisis when it would be required to support the military.”[[6]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn6) Like Russia, China has been **active** with cyber **intrusions** in U.S. energy **infrastructure**. The Mission Support Center at Idaho National Laboratory characterized these as attacks as “multiple intrusions into US ICS/SCADA [Industrial Control Systems/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition] and smart grid tools [that] may be aimed more at intellectual property theft and gathering intelligence to bolster their own infrastructure, but it is likely that they are also using these intrusions to develop capabilities to attack the [**bulk** electric system], as well.”[[7]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn7) China, therefore, has both the **capability** and **intent** to conduct cyber intrusions and attacks for myriad reasons.

Another arm of this threat is the reliance the U.S. energy industry has on imports from China, especially transformers. In early 2020, federal officials seized a transformer in the port of Houston that had been imported by the Jiangsu Huapeng Transformer Company before sending it to Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque. Sandia is contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy for mitigating national security threats.[[8]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn8) The Wall Street Journal reported that “Mike Howard, chief executive of the Electric Power Research Institute, a utility-funded technical organization, said that the diversion of a huge, expensive transformer is so unusual – in his experience, unprecedented – that it suggests officials had significant security concerns.”[[9]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn9) Previously destined for the Washington Area Power Administration’s Ault, Colo., substation, the transformer is believed to have been seized due to “backdoor” exploitable hardware emplaced by the Chinese prior to shipment.[[10]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn10) Shortly after these events, President Trump issued Executive Order 13920, “[Securing the United States Bulk-Power System](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk-power-system/),” essentially limiting the import of Chinese-built critical energy infrastructure components due to concerns about cybersecurity.[[11]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn11) Interestingly, Jiangsu Huapeng “boasted that it supported 10 percent of New York City’s electricity load.”[[12]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn12)

Franklin Kramer, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified before a U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce subcommittee during an energy and power hearing in 2011 and said that a “highly-coordinated and structured cyber, physical, or blended attack on the **bulk power** system, however, could result in long-term (**irreparable**) damage to key system components in multiple simultaneous or near-**simultaneous strikes**.” He added that “an outage could result with the potential to affect a wide geographic area and cause large population centers to lose power for **extended** periods.”[[13]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn13) Even the inclusion of features such as smart grids to the overall grid structure poses new **vulnerabilities** through their connectivity. Kramer stated that “such connectivity means that the **distribution** system could be a **key vector** for a national security attack on the grid.”[[14]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/#_ftn14)

**Those attacks cause accidental nuclear escalation.**

**Klare 19**, \*Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of **cyberstrikes** and **counterstrikes** against **vital national infrastructure** rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key **economic systems**, such as **power grids**, **financial systems**, and **transportation networks**. As noted, Russia has **infiltrated** the U.S. **electrical grid**, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.[12](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12) The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.[13](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12)

The danger here is that **economic attacks** of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an **escalating series** of **tit-for-tat attacks** against ever more **vital elements** of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing **widespread chaos** and **harm** and eventually leading one side to initiate **kinetic attacks** on **critical** military **targets**, risking the **slippery slope** to **nuclear conflict**. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”[14](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote14)

These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by **third parties**, such as **proxy states** or **terrorist organizations**, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing **early-warning systems** to generate **false readings** (“spoofing”) of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a **clear indication** of the **severity** of the **threat**. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the **dangers** of **unintended** or **accidental escalation** can only grow more **severe**.

**Cyber-compromised NC3 causes nuclear war.**

**Klare 19**, \*Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation>)

The Nuclear-Cyber Connection

These links exist because the NC3 systems of the United States and other nuclear-armed states are **heavily dependent** on **computers** and other **digital processors** for virtually **every aspect** of their **operation** and because those systems are **highly vulnerable** to cyberattack. Every nuclear force is composed, most basically, of weapons, early-warning radars, launch facilities, and the top officials, usually presidents or prime ministers, empowered to initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all, however, is an extended network of **communications** and **data-processing** systems, all reliant on **cyberspace**. Warning systems, ground- and space-based, must constantly watch for and analyze possible enemy missile launches. Data on actual threats must rapidly be **communicated** to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible responses and **communicate** chosen outcomes to launch facilities, which in turn must provide attack vectors to delivery systems. All of this involves **operations** in **cyberspace**, and it is in this domain that great power rivals seek **vulnerabilities** to exploit in a constant struggle for advantage.

The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over adversaries takes many forms and is not always aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused of engaging in widespread **cyberespionage** to steal technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and military advantages. Russia has been accused, most extensively in the Robert Mueller report, of exploiting cyberspace to **interfere** in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, have used the internet for **recruiting** combatants and spreading fear. Criminal groups, including some thought to be allied with state actors, such as North Korea, have used cyberspace to **extort money** from banks, municipalities, and individuals.[4](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote04) Attacks such as these occupy most of the time and attention of civilian and military cybersecurity organizations that attempt to thwart such attacks. Yet for those who worry about strategic stability and the risks of nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern.

This concern stems from the fact that, despite the immense effort devoted to protecting NC3 systems from cyberattack, no enterprise that relies so extensively on computers and cyberspace can be made 100 percent invulnerable to attack. This is so because such systems employ many devices and operating systems of various origins and vintages, most incorporating numerous software updates and “patches” over time, offering multiple vectors for attack. Electronic components can also be modified by hostile actors during production, transit, or insertion; and the **whole system** itself is **dependent** to a **considerable degree** on the **electrical grid**, which itself is **vulnerable** to cyberattack and is far **less protected**. Experienced “**cyberwarriors**” of every major power have been working for years to probe for **weaknesses** in these systems and in many cases have devised cyberweapons, typically, malicious software (**malware**) and computer viruses, to exploit those weaknesses for military advantage.[5](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote05)

Although activity in cyberspace is much more difficult to detect and track than conventional military operations, enough information has become public to indicate that the major **nuclear powers**, notably China, Russia, and the United States, along with such secondary powers as Iran and North Korea, have established **extensive** cyberwarfare capabilities and engage in **offensive cyberoperations** on a **regular basis**, often aimed at **critical** military **infrastructure**. “Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant contact with adversaries,” General Paul M. Nakasone, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command (Cybercom), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2019. “We see near-peer competitors [China and Russia] conducting sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American strength and gain strategic advantage.”

Although eager to speak of adversary threats to U.S. interests, Nakasone was noticeably but not surprisingly reluctant to say much about U.S. offensive operations in cyberspace. He acknowledged, however, that Cybercom took such action to disrupt possible Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections. “We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their efforts,” he testified in February. According to press accounts, this included a cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the Internet Research Agency, a “troll farm” in St. Petersburg said to have been deeply involved in generating disruptive propaganda during the 2016 presidential elections.[6](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote06)

Other press investigations have disclosed two other offensive operations undertaken by the United States. One called “Olympic Games” was intended to disrupt Iran’s drive to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity by sabotaging the centrifuges used in the process by infecting them with the so-called Stuxnet virus. Another left of launch effort was intended to cause malfunctions in North Korean missile tests.[7](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote07) Although not aimed at either of the U.S. principal nuclear adversaries, those two attacks demonstrated a willingness and capacity to conduct cyberattacks on the nuclear infrastructure of other states.

Efforts by **strategic rivals of** the United States to **infiltrate** and eventually **degrade** U.S. **nuclear infrastructure** are far **less documented** but thought to be **no less prevalent**. Russia, for example, is believed to have planted **malware** in the U.S. electrical utility grid, possibly with the intent of **cutting off** the **flow** of **electricity** to critical **NC3 facilities** in the event of a major crisis.[8](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote08) Indeed, every major power, including the United States, is believed to have **crafted cyberweapons** aimed at critical **NC3 components** and to have implanted malware in enemy systems for potential use in some future confrontation.

Pathways to Escalation

Knowing that the NC3 systems of the major powers are constantly being probed for weaknesses and probably infested with malware designed to be activated in a crisis, what does this say about the risks of escalation from a nonkinetic battle, that is, one fought without traditional weaponry, to a kinetic one, at first using conventional weapons and then, potentially, nuclear ones? None of this can be predicted in advance, but those analysts who have studied the subject worry about the emergence of dangerous new pathways for escalation. Indeed, several such scenarios have been identified.[9](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote09)

The first and possibly most **dangerous path** to **escalation** would arise from the **early use** of **cyberweapons** in a great power **crisis** to ~~paralyze~~ **undermine** the vital command, control, and communications capabilities of an adversary, many of which serve nuclear and conventional forces. In the “**fog of war**” that would naturally ensue from such an encounter, the recipient of such an attack might fear more punishing follow-up kinetic attacks, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, and, **fearing** the **loss** of its own **arsenal**, **launch** its weapons **immediately**. This might occur, for example, in a confrontation between NATO and Russian forces in east and central Europe or between U.S. and Chinese forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Speaking of a possible confrontation in Europe, for example, James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine wrote that “both sides would have **overwhelming incentives** to go **early** with **offensive** cyber and counter-space **capabilities** to **negate** the other side’s military capabilities or **advantages**.” If these early attacks succeeded, “it could result in huge **military** and **coercive advantage** for the attacker.” This might induce the recipient of such attacks to back down, affording its rival a major victory at very low cost. Alternatively, however, the recipient might view the attacks on its critical command, control, and communications infrastructure as the **prelude** to a **full-scale attack** aimed at **neutralizing** its **nuclear capabilities** and choose to strike first. “It is worth considering,” Miller and Fontaine concluded, “how even a very limited attack or incident could set both sides on a slippery slope to rapid escalation.”[10](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote10)

What makes the insertion of **latent malware** in an adversary’s NC3 systems so **dangerous** is that it may not even **need** to be **activated** to **increase** the **risk** of **nuclear escalation**. If a nuclear-armed state comes to believe that its critical systems are infested with enemy malware, its leaders might **not trust** the information provided by its early-warning systems in a crisis and might **misconstrue** the **nature** of an **enemy attack**, leading them to **overreact** and possibly **launch** their **nuclear weapons** out of **fear** they are at **risk** of a **preemptive strike**.

“The **uncertainty** caused by the unique character of a cyber threat could **jeopardize** the **credibility** of the **nuclear deterrent** and **undermine strategic stability** in ways that advances in nuclear and conventional weapons do not,” Page O. Stoutland and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer wrote in 2018 paper for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “[T]he introduction of a **flaw** or **malicious code** into nuclear weapons through the **supply chain** that **compromises** the **effectiveness** of those **weapons** could lead to a **lack** of **confidence** in the **nuclear deterrent**,” undermining strategic stability.[11](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote11) Without confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, a nuclear-armed state may misinterpret confusing signals from its early-warning systems and, fearing the worst, launch its own nuclear weapons rather than lose them to an enemy’s first strike. This makes the scenario proffered in the 2018 NPR report, of a nuclear response to an enemy cyberattack, that much more alarming.

**1AC — Plan**

**Plan: The United States federal judiciary should substantially increase prohibitions on private sector conduct that is more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of information technology standards.**

**1AC — Solvency**

**Solvency —**

**The plan requires SSO’s to administer reasonable action to prohibit ex post opportunism---that strengthens FRAND effectiveness while enabling SEP holders to capture appropriate royalties---which is the best competition-innovation balance.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

3. Application of the Basic Legal Principles

The antitrust principle is **straightforward**: industry-wide collaboration through SSOs to establish procompetitive standards is **permitted** only if it is **no more restrictive** of competition than **reasonably necessary** to enable creation of the standards. When standard setting predictably creates technology **monopolies** that, if unrestrained, will enable **anticompetitive** ex post **opportunism** that would otherwise not occur, an SSO that **does not** take **effective** measures to prevent or minimize such ex post opportunism engages in conduct that is **more restrictive** of competition than necessary. In that case, the SSO and, in appropriate cases, its members, may well **violate Section 1** of the **Sherman Act**.

Under this principle, SSO procedures and FRAND rules should be **evaluated** based on whether they lead to **reasonable** SEP **royalties**, using the competitive ex ante licensing standard discussed above, which has been **adopted** by the courts in patent law. Put differently, FRAND rules should be evaluated based on their ability to prevent SEP holders from obtaining **more** than the **ex ante value** of their **technology** from implementers.

This limitation **would not** prevent a SEP holder from **proﬁting**, perhaps **greatly**, from participating in the SSO and having its patented technology included in the standard. The SEP holder **continues** to be **rewarded** for its technology because the inclusion of its technology in the standard can still **greatly increase** the volume of licensing opportunities available to the SEP holder.

Whether a particular set of FRAND rules are sufficiently effective in preventing ex post opportunism will depend on the particular circumstances. The procedural unfolding of the case will also depend upon the circumstances. As a general matter, the case would probably be structured as an ordinary **Rule of Reason** case.82

First, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate **harm** to **competition** as a result of the collaboration of the SSO’s members, many of which compete with one another. In this case, the harm to competition would stem from the ability of the SEP holder to exercise **monopoly** power by obtaining royalties in **excess** of the **competitive**, ex ante level. The decision to include patented technologies in the standard would be the allegedly **unlawful** agreement. Notably, the court **need not** determine what a FRAND royalty is; it would **suffice** to **determine** that **market power** has been **created** or **exercised**, and that existing SSO rules and policies were **not adequate** to prevent the competitive harm. The defendant, which could be the SSO or perhaps one or more SSO members, would win at this point if the plaintiff failed to show harm to competition. If might fail if the standard faces substantial competition and the court concludes that the SEP holder therefore does not have market power or if the SSO’s rules and policies are found to be effective in preventing ex post opportunism, even if the plaintiff or even the court thinks that other rules and policies would be preferable.

Second, if the plaintiff makes the requisite showing of harm to competition, the **defendant(s)** would then have to show some **procompetitive justiﬁcation**— in this case, the **beneﬁts** of the standard. These two initial steps should be straightforward.

Third, if as is likely the defendant is able to show a procompetitive justiﬁcation, the plaintiff would have to show that the SSO could have used available, reasonable **alternatives** to realize the **efficiency beneﬁts** with less or **none** of the competitive **harms**. The plaintiff might identify reasonable **alternatives** that would have led to a **different** standard, based on including **unpatented** technology in the standard or perhaps involving **fewer SEPs** or **fewer owners** of SEPs, which would be **less subject** to patent holdup. More likely, the plaintiff could suggest alternative SSO rules that would not change the standard, but would **reduce** the **likelihood** or extent of ex post **opportunism**. For example, the plaintiff might suggest more rigorous FRAND-type rules, such as rules that set forth more precise principles on which FRAND royalties are to be determined and the circumstances under which SEP holders might seek injunctions.

Fourth, the burden would then shift to the defendant(s) to show that the beneﬁts of the standard **could not** have been **realized** if the SSO had adopted any of the proffered **alternatives** or that those alternatives were unrealistic.83 The plaintiff would be entitled to judgment if the court concludes that those beneﬁts could have been realized with less competitive harm if the SSO had adopted the standard with different IPR rules or policies.

Our overall sense, based on experience and the empirical literature, is that the extant FRAND rules are generally useful, but tend to be **inadequate** because they are **imprecise** and leave **unresolved** such critical issues as (a) the meaning of a **reasonable** royalty, even conceptually; (b) the meaning of “**non-discriminatory**;” (c) to whom licenses must be offered; and (d) under what circumstances may a SEP holder obtain an injunction.84 These **imprecise** FRAND commitments are therefore **not sufficient** to adequately prevent ex post opportunism. The recent revisions to IEEE’s FRAND policy represent a signiﬁcant step in the right direction, but even this advance leaves important questions **unanswered**.85 If FRAND rules are inadequate in these ways, litigation involving extant FRAND rules would likely be resolved only at the ﬁnal, fourth step. The defendant would be able to **demonstrate** the **beneﬁts** created by the standard; the plaintiff would be able to demonstrate the **creation** of **market power** and that other reasonable and practical rules or policies would **ameliorate** the problem. The case would thus turn on whether the defendant is able to demonstrate that signiﬁcant beneﬁts associated with standardization could not have been realized if the SSO had adopted those other rules or policies.

The court would have **available** a **variety** of **possible remedies** if the plaintiff prevails. Implementers that paid supracompetitive royalties or were unlawfully excluded in whole or in part from product markets as a result of the inadequate FRAND policies would be **entitled** to **damages** and, in some cases, to **treble damages**.86 If the unlawful SSO conduct is regarded as the **collective action** of the SSO and its members, which is likely to be the case in most instances, SSO members would be **jointly** and **severally liable** for the damages. Forward-looking injunctive relief aimed at restoring competition would need to be fashioned to the requirements of the individual case. For example, a court could order the SSO to adopt a new rule or policy proposed by the plaintiff. If the court is reluctant to take on that governance role, it might give the SSO a period of time—maybe ninety days—to develop a rule, subject to the court’s ultimate approval, which would adequately ameliorate the competitive problem created by the SSO. Alternatively or in addition, the court might order the parties to attempt to **negotiate** a **rule** or policy on which they can agree. And, depending on the circumstances, the court might order SEP holders, including at least those that were defendants in the case, to comply with the new SSO rules and policies.

**Threatening antitrust liability lures SSO’s into adopting best practices.**

**Lemley & Shapiro 13**, \*Mark Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor at Stanford Law School and a partner at Durie Tangri LLP; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley and a Senior Consultant at Charles River Associates; (2013, “A SIMPLE APPROACH TO SETTING REASONABLE ROYALTIES FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS”, (https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/frand.pdf)

Under our approach, many of these issues should become moot, since the patentee cannot obtain an injunction (or transfer the patent to someone who can) against a willing licensee, and since competitors are not involved in jointly setting the reasonable royalty rate. If SSOs set clear, reasonable rules following the best practices we recommend, and parties follow those rules, there should be **little** or **no need** for **antitrust** to **intervene**. Indeed, even the risk of non-disclosure of a patent is lessened, since the patentee has committed to license its essential patents whether or not it discloses them. For the most part, the rules we have described are **self-executing**, meaning that even if a party tries to break the rules set by the SSO there still may be no need for antitrust to intervene. Thus, we suggest that **parties** who **abide** by these **procedures**—patentees, implementers, and the SSOs themselves—should be **immune** from **antitrust liability** for activities that merely follow those rules.107 They have entered into an arrangement that is **on balance good** for **competition**, one that allows patentees to receive **reasonable royalties** but **prevents holdup** and **reduces** the risk of **monopolization** by **trickery**.

The fact that antitrust remains a last resort available when SSOs don’t follow best practices may have two practical benefits, however. First, under our approach the **promise** of **avoiding** the risk of **antitrust liability** will be a **powerful incentive** for both SSOs and patent owners to **adopt** the **best practices** we propose. Second, the risk of antitrust liability may be relevant when an individual patentee wants to adopt best practices but the SSO governing the standard has not yet done so. We propose that a patentee that unilaterally commits to the FRAND procedures we describe here should be immune from antitrust liability for following these procedures.108 A patentee’s unilateral binding commitment to arbitration could be enforced whether or not it was elicited by an SSO. Thus, just as the prospect of antitrust immunity might **lure SSOs** to **adopt best practices**, it might also lure **patentees** to **implement** those **practices** even if the SSO has not done so. Given the large number of standard-essential patents based on preexisting standards,109 and given that SSOs tend to update their IP rules rather slowly,110 this is **not** a **small matter**.

**Only antitrust enforcement creates a consumer-action feature that counterbalances SSO’s conspiratorial incentives---private action fails.**

**Melamed & Shapiro 18**, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, <https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf>)

2. Why Antitrust Enforcement Is Necessary

Some SSO members have an interest in ensuring that the SSO takes steps to minimize the potential harms from the SEP holders’ monopoly power, and this undoubtedly explains in part why most SSOs have adopted FRAND policies or similar requirements. But, as shown in the economic model in the Appendix,73 SSOs **cannot** in general **be counted on** to adopt effective FRAND policies. The bases for this conclusion, which is central to our argument for the applicability of Section 1 to SSO FRAND rules, can be summarized as follows.74

First, the SSO members **collectively have an interest** in permitting SEP holders to charge supracompetitive royalties that elevate the downstream price of compliant devices to the monopoly level. Doing so will enable the members **in aggregate** to collect **increased revenues** from consumers, and thus to generate **increased profits** that in theory could be **shared by all** the members. In other words, supracompetitive royalties can enrich industry participants as a group at the expense of final consumers. This fact alone should serve as a **clear and strong signal** regarding the **dangers** of counting on SSOs to implement effective FRAND policies: if the SSO members negotiate **efficiently**, the outcome will be **just as bad** for consumers as if the members agreed to **fix downstream prices**.75 The **fundamental problem** is that **final consumers** are **not at the table** when the SSO rules are negotiated.

Second, SSO members that own SEPs but earn little or no profits as implementers have a **powerful self-interest** in being able to exercise the ex post monopoly power associated with their SEPs. Because SSO policies are usually determined by a **consensus** process, these members will likely be able to **block the adoption** of **fully effective FRAND policies**. Moreover, these SSO members often have the greatest interest in SSO patent policies. Since much of their income may be attributable to patent licensing, they can be expected to devote substantial resources to block the adoption of FRAND policies that effectively prevent patent holdup.

Third, even SSO members that earn **significant profits** as implementers may have **mixed incentives** if they also own SEPs, which can also lead to **weak or in-effective FRAND rules**. In the Appendix, we show that, if the **requisite share** of votes in the SSO are cast by firms whose **share of SEP royalties** is at least as large as their share of **downstream profits**, and if these firms can coordinate their voting over the FRAND rules, then an SSO **unconstrained** by antitrust laws will establish FRAND rules leading to an outcome **no better for consumers** than would result from an **integrated monopolist** controlling all SEPs and all downstream sales.76

Fourth, even SSO members that are **downstream implementers** and own few, if any, SEPs may have only a **modest interest** in promoting effective policies to restrict ex post opportunism. Because all implementers will be subject to the opportunism, all of them will face **increased licensing costs**, and therefore will likely be able to **pass on** most or all of the **increased costs** to their customers.77 Furthermore, these implementers might not be **especially active** or **effective** in the standard-setting process for **free-riding** or **public-good** reasons, especially if SEP royalties constitute only a **relatively small portion** of the costs of their standard-implementing products. Public choice theory predicts that the highly motivated SEP holders are likely to have the **greatest influence** over **patent policies**.

Empirical evidence bears out these concerns. As a starting point, we find it striking that SSO FRAND rules are almost **always quite vague**.78 Notably, SSOs in which SEP holders are more prevalent tend to have weaker FRAND rules.79 Further, to our knowledge, SSOs have made almost **no effort** to enforce their FRAND rules and have, instead, **left enforcement** efforts to **others**.80 This evidence raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the existing FRAND rules in preventing ex post opportunism.

#### Antitrust is critical---the broad standing and available remedies afforded are vastly superior to any other types of law.

Cary et al. 11, \*Messrs. George Cary and Alex Sistla are members of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Mark Nelson is a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Steven Kaiser is a member of the New Jersey and District of Columbia Bars; (2011, “THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST LAW TO POLICE THE PATENT HOLDUP PROBLEM INSTANDARD SETTING”, <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/the-case-for-antitrust-law-to-police-the-patent-holdup-problem-in-the-standard-setting.pdf>)

III. CONCLUSION

Patent holdup where a patentee has deceived an SSO in order to secure a position in the standard is, at its core, an antitrust problem. In this context, patent holders harm consumers by exploiting the competition-reducing aspects of standard setting to their own private advantage. In addition to being the body of law directed toward anticompetitive conduct, antitrust provides numerous practical advantages, including the possibility of governmental enforcement, and appropriately broad standing.

Remedying the patent holdup problem exclusively through non-antitrust legal remedies would be perverse. Indeed, it would be a bit like remedying patent infringement through the doctrine of common law conversion. In some instances, it might work, but there certainly would be under-enforcement.

To be sure, there are instances where deceptive conduct by the patentee does not harm competition and, in those instances, there is no antitrust claim. Often there will be patent remedies in that situation, or contract or even tort remedies. The legal regimes can and do coexist peacefully.

Those who argue that the marginal benefit of antitrust remedies do not out-weigh the cost of antitrust litigation both understate the benefits (broad standing and ready remedies where appropriate) and overstate the costs (the potential, however unknown, of “false positives,” i.e., condemning behavior that is not anticompetitive). In addition to being overstated, the false positives concern is also misplaced in this context. Unlike an antitrust attack on price cutting or a securities offering, the risk of a false positive here is not the over-deterrence of desired behavior, but rather that over-deterrence of deceptive and opportunistic behavior. Fretting about that form of over-deterrence seems itself to be a misallocation of resources. And preventing that form of over-deterrence by reliance on the competitive outcomes under legal regimes not designed to protect competition strikes us as unwise.

#### Ex ante valuations streamline innovation by weeding out the nonessentials and rewarding truly essential patents---increases court efficiency.

Arsego 15, \*David Arsego, J.D., Brooklyn Law School, May 2016, Certificate in Intellectual Property Law, B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, Villanova University, May 2010, works at Fay Kaplun & Marcin; (“The Problem with FRAND: How the Licensing Commitments of Standard-Setting Organizations Result in the Misvaluing of Patents”, <https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1416&context=bjil>)

A common theme in current FRAND litigation is inflated claims for damages and desired royalty rates. Judge Holderman in In re Innovatio IP Ventures reduced IP Ventures’ award to a few percentage points of its original claim. He justified this action by stressing the importance of the patent to the standard at issue and ruled that patents of lesser importance are not entitled to as high of rates as patents of greater importance. This proposed valuation framework intends to assess that very same importance, ex ante and prior to any negotiations or litigation. The intent is for contracting parties to have an initial understanding of the patent value prior to negotiations. In the same way that Judge Holderman’s judgement turned on the classification of the at-issue patents as “of moderate to moderate-high importance to the standard”, an opinion from ETSI that assesses this same importance would give negotiation parties a relatively clear picture of the importance of their patents.

D. The Effects of Such Valuation

The intended effect of this mandatory patent valuation is not to solve every patent-licensing disagreement that parties will have. It is merely a proposed tool that will help companies come to an agreement more efficiently. Both parties will be aware if one party has a portfolio full of patents with little importance and will not waste time debating the value. Similarly, if two parties are in litigation regarding whether or not a royalty rate is FRAND, the judge will not have to perform an independent analysis of the patent’s importance herself, but can instead rely on ETSI’s determination. The effect of this reliance, and the initial determination of essentiality, will be far reaching. Duplicitous patent holders that may claim essentiality for meritless patents will now be barred from asserting SEP rights.246 Important innovators with valuable patents will be more justly rewarded for their innovation, not only by having an “important” label on their SEPs, but by no longer competing for royalties with patents that are deemed to be nonessential.

#### Ex ante disclosure solves lock-in, improves transparency and openness.

Contreras 13, \*Jorge L. Contreras is a Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law at the University of Utah with an adjunct appointment in the Department of Human Genetics. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School (JD) and Rice University (BSEE, BA); (Contreras, J. L. (2013). TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND EX ANTE DISCLOSURE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF AN EMPIRICAL STUDY. Jurimetrics, 53(2), 163-211. Retrieved from https://www2.lib.ku.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/technical-standards-ex-ante-disclosure-results/docview/1428261870/se-2?accountid=14556)

Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms could potentially alleviate the causes of such disputes by making a patent holder's royalty rate known before lock-in of a standard. Thus, if maximum royalty rates were known in advance, it would be more difficult for an implementer to argue that such rates were unreasonable (as the SDO could have chosen an alternative technology if this were the case).148 Lacking this potential defense against an infringement claim by the patent holder, implementers might be more inclined to negotiate with patent holders before the adoption of a standard. By the same token, if a patent holder knew that its maximum royalty rate would be scrutinized before the approval of a standard, and that SDO participants would be free to consider alternative, less costly technologies, it would have an incentive to disclose a royalty rate that was as reasonable (or low) as possible.149

Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms has an intuitive appeal. Like the prices of menu items at a restaurant, it has been argued that the royalty rates for standards-essential patents should be disclosed before product vendors (diners) are locked into costly technology choices. But critics of ex ante disclosure have argued that requiring early disclosure of licensing terms will impede standards-development processes and create additional legal risks for participants. To assess the validity of these complaints, we studied ex ante licensing disclosures at VITA, IEEE and IETF and found no evidence that such policies resulted in measurable negative effects on the number of standards started or adopted, personal time commitments or quality of standards, nor was there compelling evidence that ex ante policies caused the lengthening of time required for standardization or the depression of royalty rates. There was evidence to suggest that the adoption of ex ante policies may have contributed to positive effects observed on some of these variables. In addition, a significant majority of participants in VITA, the only SDO adopting a mandatory ex ante policy, felt that the information elicited by the organization's ex ante policy improved the overall openness and transparency of the standards-development process. Thus, while there are numerous areas in which further study and analysis may be warranted, and other organizations in which the implementation of ex ante policies may have different effects, we concluded that the process-based criticisms of ex ante policies and the predicted negative effects flowing from the adoption of such policies are not supported by the available evidence.

# 2AC

## ADVANTAGE---INNOVATION

#### 2 — there’s no impact to winning this argument.

Cotter et al. 19, \*Thomas F. Cotter, Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Innovators Network Foundation Intellectual Property Fellow; \*Erik Hovenkamp, Assistant Professor, USC Gould School of Law; \*Norman Siebrasse, Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law; (2019, “Demystifying Patent Holdup”, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4667&context=wlulr)

B. Patent Holdup Is Not a Problem, Because It Is Not Systemic

A second, related argument is that there is no empirical evidence of patent owners engaging in pervasive, systemic patent holdup in the very industries holdup theorists are most concerned with (e.g., telecommunications).139 Indeed, according to the critics, if holdup were pervasive one would expect innovation and growth in the affected industries to “stagnate, wither, or die,”140 whereas if one looks “across human history, it is not clear that the commercialization of complex technologies has ever been faster than it is today in those industries that reform proponents point to as most plagued by the patent holdup ‘problem.’”141

Although we agree that whether, or to what extent, patent holdup occurs in the real world is ultimately an empirical matter, the implication that patent holdup is a problem only if it is “pervasive” or “systemic” is a non sequitur.142 If our analysis above is correct—that the ability to engage in patent holdup depends on path dependence, that settings conducive to patent holdup are not uncommon, and that the three components of a holdup royalty can exist independently of one another—patent holdup does not have to be systemic to be capable of reducing social welfare. Seeing how the empirical critiques of patent holdup do “not claim[ ] that individual firms never attempt to engage in behavior that can be characterized as holdup,”143 the conclusion that holdup is not systemic may well be accurate, for all we know, while still being of any limited relevance for purposes of determining whether injunctive relief should issue on the facts of any one particular case.144 If the choice were between always granting an injunction without tailoring or conditions, and never granting any form of injunctive relief, perhaps the question of whether holdup was systemic, at least in a particular industry, would be central. But the traditional approach to injunctive relief looks to the facts of the particular case.145

#### Don’t trust neg authors---Qualcomm funded their papers.

McLaughlin 21, Bloomberg, (David, March 12th, 2021, “One Tech-Funded University Helped Shape FTC’s Hands-Off Approach”, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-12/how-george-mason-university-shaped-ftc-s-hands-off-approach-to-tech>)

* Alden Abbott, Jonathan Barnett are both fellows at George Mason University’s Center for Intellectual Property and Innovation Policy (funded by Qualcomm)
* Joshua Wright is a former FTC commissioner who taught at the institute and lobbied for Qualcomm

The [Tech Transparency Project](https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/) (TTP), a watchdog group in Washington, details in a new report an unusually close relationship between the law school at Virginia’s George Mason University and the Federal Trade Commission. By helping shape the workforce of the FTC, the group claims, the school infused it with a laissez-faire philosophy favorable to the school’s tech donors.

[The report](https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/big-techs-backdoor-ftc) throws a harsh light on the FTC’s hands-off approach to tech companies over the past decade. As the agency prepares to argue the lawsuit against [Facebook Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FB:US) that it filed late last year, seeking to break up the social media giant, it must contend with an inconvenient fact: It approved Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014—the very mergers it now seeks to undo. The FTC’s consent to those deals is cited by critics as evidence of a permissive attitude that allowed tech companies to grow into leviathans.

One explanation for its lenience, the TTP report charges, is that the industry used a corner of academia to capture the agency. According to the report, which was published on March 12, Silicon Valley donated substantial sums to George Mason’s Antonin Scalia Law School, which built a pipeline of professors and graduates who went to work at the FTC. Dozens of people went from the school to the regulator—commissioners, bureau heads, attorney-advisers, legal interns—during the Obama and Trump administrations.

Under President Trump alone, professors and graduates of Scalia Law, and heads of affiliated programs at George Mason, served as the FTC chair, general counsel, policy planning head, and leaders of its three main divisions: the bureaus of competition, consumer protection, and economics.

Katie Paul, who heads the TTP, says an investigation is needed into “whether George Mason University has effectively become Big Tech’s back door into the FTC, giving the companies an undisclosed way to sway its decision-making and hobble enforcement action.”

Revolving Door

Large tech companies have donated to two programs affiliated with Scalia Law, the Global Antitrust Institute and the Law & Economics Center. From January 2018 to the end of last year, [Google](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GOOGL:US) donated $900,000, [Amazon.com Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AMZN:US) contributed $925,000, and Facebook Inc. gave $675,000, according to documents obtained by Bloomberg Businessweek through a public records request. Google, Amazon, and Facebook declined to comment on their donations.

The law school says the ties between its faculty and the FTC aren’t unusual. Alison Price, a senior associate dean, says it’s common for professors to work for federal agencies and then return to their teaching jobs. “Since Scalia Law has special expertise and a relatively large faculty in antitrust, it’s logical that our faculty is called to serve with frequency,” she says. “But faculty don’t set policy; administrations do.”

The Tech Transparency Project is part of a larger watchdog group, [Campaign for Accountability](https://campaignforaccountability.org/). The TTP website cites several philanthropists as donors, including George Soros’s Open Society Foundations. Oracle Corp. had been a donor to a TTP predecessor group that focused mostly on Google, but the TTP says it no longer accepts corporate funding.

Both George Mason programs, which host conferences and offer training for judges and antitrust enforcers, promote the consumer-welfare standard articulated by Robert Bork, the late federal judge and Yale Law School professor. That standard, the guidepost for regulators and courts since the 1980s, looks to price increases as a gauge of competitive harm. It is blamed by some antitrust experts for handcuffing enforcers when it comes to policing tech companies.

The tech companies’ donations are drawing scrutiny. At a hearing on Feb. 25, New York Democratic Representative Mondaire Jones called Abbott “Tad” Lipsky, a former FTC official now at the [Global Antitrust Institute](https://gai.gmu.edu/), “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” As he testified against proposals to give the antitrust laws more teeth, Lipsky drew Jones’s scorn. Programs such as the GAI “have worked to teach judges and regulators to let their guard down as corporate funders like yours came to dominate our economy,” Jones said. Lipsky responded that his antitrust views predated “any of these digital technology companies.”

A key figure in the law school-to-regulator pipeline is Lipsky’s boss, Joshua Wright, an FTC commissioner from 2013 to 2015. He now teaches antitrust law at George Mason while also running the GAI.

Wright wielded outsize influence at the agency, pushing through a 2015 policy statement in an attempt to rein in the agency’s enforcement power. After he left he improperly lobbied the agency on behalf of Qualcomm Inc., one of the law school’s largest donors, according to a report by the FTC inspector general that was obtained by TTP and verified by Bloomberg Businessweek. His name was redacted in the report, but Wright confirmed it was about him. He says he did nothing wrong.

The New York Times last year [reported that tech companies bankrolled the work of the GAI](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/technology/global-antitrust-institute-google-amazon-qualcomm.html) and that Wright had worked with corporate donors to fend off critics. The extent of the revolving door between the FTC and the law school, and Wright’s alleged violation of ethics laws, haven’t been previously reported.

Many companies support higher education, and many universities send professors and graduates to Washington. But George Mason is unique in cultivating a specific regulator, says Jeff Hauser, executive director of the [Revolving Door Project](https://therevolvingdoorproject.org/), which tracks government officials’ corporate ties.

“In terms of feeding directly into a government agency, I’m not aware of any equivalent at the SEC or the EPA or anything else,” he says, referring to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency.

A public university in the northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, George Mason is home to the free-market think tank the [Mercatus Center](https://www.mercatus.org/" \t "_blank" \o "Mercatus Center website). It is a leader in the study of applying economic analysis to the law, emphasizing that markets work best when government regulates less. The university became known as a haven for conservatives at the end of the Reagan administration in 1988. Even Bork taught there after stepping down from the bench in 1988.

The George Mason conduit was steady and robust, according to the TTP, which details dozens of examples of people moving between the FTC and the law school over the past decade. One is James Cooper, who directs an economics and privacy program at the Law & Economics Center. He simultaneously taught at the school and served as a deputy director for the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.

Cooper was among the academics who urged House lawmakers last year to reject proposals to break up tech companies and make merger approvals more difficult. George Mason’s Wright, Lipsky, and John Yun, a professor at the law school who was an economist at the FTC, joined the filing. Cooper didn’t respond to a request for comment, and Yun declined to comment.

But Wright, the former FTC commissioner, perhaps best embodies the ties linking the FTC to the law school and its donors. After leaving the agency in 2015, Wright simultaneously taught at George Mason, ran the GAI, and worked for the Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati law firm, where he represented Qualcomm.

The FTC sued Qualcomm in January 2017 in a monopoly case that was developed while Wright was an FTC commissioner. Wright tried to broker a settlement about four months after the case was brought. He met Lipsky, then the acting director of the FTC’s competition bureau, for lunch at a steakhouse in Washington and tried to set up an additional meeting with agency officials, according to the inspector general’s report.

In doing so, Wright violated an ethics law that bans officials for life from lobbying on issues they worked on “personally and substantially,” according to the inspector general. Those findings were referred to the Department of Justice’s public integrity section. The Justice Department, which decided not to prosecute, declined to comment.

Lipsky resigned two months after his lunch with Wright, who then hired him at the GAI. Lipsky didn’t respond to a request for comment.

“I never made any appearance at the FTC involving its enforcement action against Qualcomm or discussed the merits of the case with any FTC official,” says Wright, who declined to elaborate on the specifics of the investigation. “I immediately complied when the FTC ethics office informed me that I should not make any appearance based upon a single preliminary vote I had cast years before the case was filed.”

Qualcomm contributed almost $5.8 million to the George Mason law school programs from 2016 through 2020. Less than two months before Wright met with the FTC to try to settle the Qualcomm case, the company gave $525,000 to the GAI. The company didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Tech companies that donate to George Mason collaborate with the school’s professors on projects, according to emails obtained through a public records request.

#### 2 — Monopoly pricing undermines innovation by reducing product output, taxing follow-on inventions, and distorting the standards-development process.

Melamed & Shapiro 18, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

II. The Need For Effective FRAND Commitments

Restrictions on ex post opportunism are needed to prevent a wealth transfer from implementers and their customers to SEP holders as a result of monopoly pricing.17 But much more is at stake.

A. Underlying Economic Principles

Basic economic principles instruct that ex post monopoly pricing by SEP holders harms consumers by raising the cost of products that comply with the standard. Ex post monopoly pricing also creates welfare-reducing deadweight loss in three respects. First, it increases the cost of, and thus reduces the output of, standard-implementing products. Second, and perhaps more important, supracompetitive pricing by SEP holders increases the cost of follow-on inventions that build on or improve the technologies claimed by the SEPs. This cost acts as a tax on follow-on innovation, reducing such innovations and impairing the very process of invention that the patent laws are intended to promote. Third, the prospect of ex post monopoly pricing by SEP holders exaggerates incentives for firms to obtain patents that might become SEPs and, perhaps more important, to jockey for inclusion of their patented technologies in industry standards. The latter incentive in turn could cause delays and induce expensive rent-seeking conduct in the standard-setting process and distort the standards-development process away from optimal technical solutions in ways that further the interests of rent seekers.

#### 6 — under-compensation is empirically denied.

Stern 18, \*Richard H. Stern, Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington University Law School. A Washington, D.C. patent and antitrust attorney, Stern was Chief of the Patent Section of the US Justice Department’s Antitrust Division during the Nixon and Ford Administrations; (2018, “Who Should Own the Benefits of Standardization and the Value It Creates?”, https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1439&context=mjlst)

Furthermore, a considerable amount of standardization activity has been coming from groups that prohibit the participating companies or individuals from collecting SEP royalties—so-called “RF-RAND” (royalty-free RAND)435 and “RAND-Zero” (RAND with zero royalties) groups or groups that rely on promises not to assert essential-patent claims436—as well as from SSOs that permit RAND licensing but whose members in practice collect royalties on few, if any, standards.437 The availability of these important, royalty-free technology sources is a factor in evaluating the threatened “disincentivization” and massive resistance against the policies reflected in the IEEE 2015 Patent Policy update.

Finally, the disincentivization argument is pure ipse dixit, for no analysis of comparative rates of return on alternative investment opportunities is offered. Nor is any empirical support provided.438 The rhetoric of “Incentivize me or I’ll defect” is completely unsupported and therefore not credible.

## ADVANTAGE---CYBER

## Solvency

## AT: T---PROHIBIT = BAN

#### Prohibit can mean ‘severely hinder’---doesn’t necessitate a ban.

Washington Court of Appeals 19 (KORSMO-judge. Opinion in State v. Kimball, No. 35441-5-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2019). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/13/21).

His argument runs counter to the meaning of the word "prohibit." It means "1. To forbid by law. 2. To prevent, preclude, or severely hinder." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (10th ed. 2014). As "severely hinder" suggests, a "prohibition" need not be an all or nothing proposition.

Our court reached that same conclusion, rejecting a similar argument, in Dejarlais. There the court stated, "nothing in the statute prevents drafting a protection order which allows some contact, for instance, by telephone or through a third party. There is no requirement that all contact be prohibited." State v. Dejarlais, 136 Wn.2d 939, 945, 969 P.2d 90 (1998).

RCW 26.50.110 does not apply only to orders that prohibit all contact. Accordingly, the statute was properly applied to Mr. Kimball's behavior.

#### 2---they don’t solve limits---antitrust prohibitions can include exemptions.

Frederick 89 (Donald A. Frederick-Attorney-Adviser. “MANAGING COOPERATIVE ANTITRUST RISK” , United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Cooperative Service, Cooperative Information Report 38, <https://www.rd.usda.gov/files/cir38.pdf>, 1989, date accessed 9/5/21)

This exposes farmers to considerable antitrust risk unless their joint marketing activity is conducted in a manner exempt from antitrust prohibitions. As one judge phrased it:

“It is clear that if individual agriculturalists, through the medium of a cooperative, jointly fixed prices, reasonably or otherwise, without statutory authorization, they would be subject to prosecution.” (emphasis added) 14/

## AT: T---PRIVATE SECTOR = ALL

#### C/I — private sector includes an industry

The Law Dictionary N.D., (The Law Dictionary: Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed. “Private Sector” , <https://thelawdictionary.org/private-sector/> , date accessed 9/11/21)

What is PRIVATE SECTOR?

An industry that is composed of private companies. The corporate sector and the personal sector are encompassed in the private sector and they are responsible for the allocation of the majority of resources within the economy.

#### Includes subsets — this contextually uses ‘the’

Walker and Hofstetter 16 (Katharina Walker is Advisor for vocational skills development and Helvetas’ youth focal person. Sonja Hofstetter joined Swisscontact in Cambodia in July 2016. She is the Quality Assurance Manager and Deputy Team Leader of the Skills Development Programme. “ Study on Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education and Training (ATVET) in Developing Countries” Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC, Global Programme Food Security, 25.1.2016, <https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Agriculture-and-Food-Security/focusareas/Documents/ras_capex_ATVET_Study_2016.pdf> , date accessed 7/19/21)

In many developing countries, the private sector1 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1]] 1 The private sector is not perceived as a homogenous mass even though the terminology might suggest this to be the case. In this study, the term “private sector” is used to circumscribe the various actors such as small and medium sized companies, large companies, sectorial associations, business associations, chambers of commerce, etc.[[END FOOTNOTE 1]] faces challenges in finding adequately skilled employees. This also holds true for sectors linked to agriculture, e.g. processing, distribution, marketing, etc. The development of ATVET from a purely productivity-oriented approach to provide broader and more specialised skills sets along agricultural value chains is likely to raise the interest of private sector actors. This incentive can result in a stronger and more sustainable financial and conceptual engagement of employers in ATVET.

#### ‘By’ only requires anticompetitive practices resulting from private sector action.

Michigan Court of Appeals 10 (SAWYER, J. Opinion in DEQ. v. Worth Twp., 808 N.W.2d 260, 289 Mich. App. 414 (Ct. App. 2010). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/23/21).

Second, we look to the meaning of the phrase "by the municipality." This phrase is key because it answers plaintiffs' contention that MCL 324.3109(2) imposes responsibility for a discharge on a municipality without regard to the source of the discharge. That is, plaintiffs argue that any discharge of raw sewage within a municipality constitutes prima facie evidence of a violation by the municipality even if the municipality is not the source of the discharge. We disagree. The word "by" has many meanings. For its meaning as a nonlegal term, we look to a layman's dictionary rather than a legal one. Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 756, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998). We find these definitions from the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) to be particularly helpful: "10. through the agency of" and "12. as a result or on the basis of[.]" Thus, MCL 324.3109(2) imposes responsibility on the municipality not when the violation merely occurs within the boundaries 264\*264 of the municipality, but when the violation occurs "through the agency of" the municipality or "as a result" of the municipality, that is to say, when it is the actions of the municipality that lead to the discharge.

## AT: T---EXPAND SCOPE =/= COURTS

#### We meet---the plan expands the scope of the Sherman Act to hold SSO’s liable for unreasonably restricting commerce.

Wright 9 (University Professor Joshua D. Wright is the Executive Director of the Global Antitrust Institute and holds a courtesy appointment in the Department of Economics. On January 1, 2013, the U.S. Senate unanimously confirmed Professor Wright as a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), following his nomination by President Obama to that position. He rejoined Scalia Law School as a full-time member of the faculty in Fall 2015. “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, STANDARD SETTING, AND THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST” , <https://laweconcenter.org/resource/intellectual-property-standard-setting-and-the-limits-of-antitrust/> , 22 OCTOBER 2009, date accessed 9/4/21)

One of the most significant challenges facing competition policy today is defining the appropriate role of antitrust law within the context of intellectual property right licensing by standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”). Many commentators believe it is necessary to apply the full force of the antitrust laws, and sometimes special rules that would increase the scope of antitrust, to the standard-setting process in order to adequately oversee what they perceive as a unique opportunity for anticompetitive behavior. Indeed, antitrust agencies both in the United States and around the world have expressed agreement with the notion that the standard setting process requires strong enforcement of antitrust liability rules in order to ensure efficient outcomes that benefit consumers. However, this view largely fails to consider the costs of antitrust. In particular, it fails to recognize the limits of antitrust when the marginal benefit of antitrust enforcement is slight and the potential for erroneous enforcement (“false positives”) and thus, the likelihood that procompetitive behavior will be deterred, is high. The Supreme Court itself has emphasized repeatedly that the scope of the antitrust laws should be responsive to such a cost-benefit analysis.

#### Counter-interp---court decisions change the scope of antitrust prohibitions.

Turner 90 (DONALD F. TURNER- was an American antitrust attorney, economist, legal scholar and educator who spent most of his career teaching at Harvard Law School. “The virtues and problems of antitrust law” , The Antitrust Bulletin/Summer 1990, Hein accessed online via KU Libraries , date accessed 9/6/21)

However, unsound interpretations of antitrust laws have adverse economic effects. Court-formulated rules have varied from time to time over the years since antitrust statutes were passed, and the scope of antitrust prohibitions were either enlarged or reduced. While there are extensive disputes as to what the precedents' defects have been and are, it is generally recognized that antitrust law has had and still has some undesirable features that the courts or Congress should correct.

#### Court decisions also change the law.

California Supreme Court 88 (PANELLI-judge. Opinion in Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P. 2d 923 - Cal: Supreme Court 1988. Google scholar caselaw, date accessed 9/13/21)

At a less legalistic but more fundamental level, plaintiff argues, with some persuasive force, that prior to Sindell she could not have prevailed on her 1116\*1116 suit. She notes that during the time that defendants argue her action would have been timely, McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 87 Cal. App.3d 77 (overruled by Sindell, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588), effectively barred her claim. In McCreery, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff who could not identify the precise manufacturer of the pills ingested by her mother did not allege a cause of action. Plaintiff undoubtedly fell into this group. (6a), (5b) The response to plaintiff's contention is that a change in the law, either by statute or by case law, does not revive claims otherwise barred by the statute of limitations.

#### The term ‘law’ alone includes court decisions.

Olson 18 (OLSON-judge. Opinion in Commonwealth v. Robertson, 186 A. 3d 440 - Pa: Superior Court 2018. Google scholar caselaw, date accessed 9/2/21).

Furthermore, the word "law" is generally regarded as including court decisions. The relevant definition of "law" in Black's Law Dictionary is, "The aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted legal principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and administrative action; esp[ecially], the body of rules, standards, and principles that the courts of a particular jurisdiction apply in deciding controversies brought before them[.]" Black's Law Dictionary, 1015 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). Hence, "law" is not only "legislation" but also "judicial precedents." Birchfield was a judicial precedent which was the law of this Commonwealth at the time of Appellee's arrest. Cf. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (the Constitution is the supreme law of our nation). Accordingly, the presumption that an individual is aware of the law includes not just statutory compilations but also judicial decisions. Thus, the trial court erred in finding that Appellee was presumed to believe she was subject to enhanced criminal penalties because of the unconstitutional provision of the Motor Vehicle Code.

#### Expand includes clarification, not amendment.

Washington Court of Appeals 4 (HOUGHTON, J. Opinion in State v. Cannon, 84 P. 3d 283 - Wash: Court of Appeals, 2nd Div. 2004. Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/12/21).

In 2002, the House and Senate introduced two identical bills, House Bill 1512 and Senate Bill 6346, to alter the definition of "photograph." The Final Bill Report on House Bill 1512 states, "The term `photograph' in the child pornography statutes is expanded to include digital images and both tangible and intangible items." H.B. REP. on HB 1512, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.2002). Cannon argues that by using the word "expand," the Legislature indicates that it amended rather than clarified the statute. We disagree.

#### Overlimiting and predictability---like it or not, this is a courts topic---the role of lawmaking was been delegated to the courts.

Rosen 99 (Mark D. Rosen-Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. “Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space” , The University of Chicago Law Review, 66:622, 1999, <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5039&context=uclrev> , date accessed 9/3/21)

Consider antitrust law in this regard. The prohibitions found in the core antitrust statutes for the most part eschew formalistic expression; they essentially state policy goals and delegate the development of formalistic rules to the courts. 14 [[FOOTNOTE 14 BEGINS]] " This is recognized by virtually all antitrust scholars. See, for example, Phillip Areeda and Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases 5-6 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1988) (noting that "the [Sherman] Act may be little more than a legislative command that the judiciary develop a common law of antitrust"); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex L Rev 661, 663 (1982) (arguing that in antitrust "Congress in effect delegated much of its lawmaking power to the judicial branch"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 Tex L Rev 705, 706 (1982) (arguing that the antitrust statutes "authorized the Supreme Court to invent and enforce a law of restraint of trade in the common law fashion"). [[FOOTNOTE 14 ENDS]] For example, the Sherman Act makes unlawful every "contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade""15 and conduct to 'monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... any part of ... trade."16 This central statutory provision thus does not identify concretely what actions are impermissible, but instead describes the prohibited acts in highly abstract terms that restate the statute's ultimate policy goals. 17 The fact that a few provisions of the antitrust statutes do employ formalistic rules 8 underscores the significance of Congress's decision to adopt, for the most part, nonformalistic antitrust law, for it establishes that Congress knew how to draft formalistic rules when it wanted to. But why did Congress elect to rely predominantly on broad standards in this field of law? A plausible answer is that Congress did not perceive itself as being capable of providing effective detailed rules because it had "little understanding of what the government could and ought to do to" achieve antitrust's policy goals. 9 Congress well could have believed that courts, by contrast, could function as "great laboratories of the law" where "[e]very new case is an experiment" such that "if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule [can be] reconsidered."'20

## AT: Vagueness

#### A ‘reasonably necessary’ lens is consistent with long-held antitrust principles.

Melamed & Shapiro 18, \*A. Douglas Melamed is Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School; \*Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley; (May 2018, “How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective”, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/How-Antitrust-Law-Can-Make-FRAND-Commitments-More-Effective.pdf)

The key antitrust question, therefore, is: how does the law reconcile the legitimate purpose of collaborative standard setting with its likely creation of market power for SEP holders? The answer is found in the fundamental principle of antitrust law that, when firms—and especially competitors—collaborate, even for a legitimate purpose, their collaboration must be no more restrictive of competition than reasonably necessary to enable achievement of the legitimate purpose.

This principle has its origins in the common law 67 and in some of the earliest U.S. antitrust cases.68 It means not just that the collaboration in question—for present purposes, SSO rules and practices regarding the creation of standards and the licensing of SEPs—must on balance enhance competition or consumer welfare, but also that the collaboration is unlawful if a different set of rules and practices could largely achieve the intended benefits with less harm.69 As the Court explained in Allied Tube, “[a]n association cannot validate the anticompetitive activities of its members simply by adopting rules that fail to pro- vide . . . safeguards” against conduct by members “with economic interests in restraining competition.”70

This principle has repeatedly been expressed in lower court decisions and antitrust enforcement agency guidelines. In Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, which concerned the lawfulness of a professional association’s rules of practice, the court reasoned as follows: “[A] practice intended to benefit the public may have a collateral adverse effect on competition. If it does, then such a practice must be the least restrictive means of achieving the desired goal and the public benefit rendered must outweigh the adverse effect on competition.”71 And the U.S. enforcement agencies’ Competitor Collaboration Guidelines make clear that when a collaboration among competitors harms competition or creates market power—as the creation by SSOs of monopoly power for SEP holders surely does—that harm must be justified by an offsetting, procompetitive justification.

## AT: CP---Collusion

#### Patentees would simply sue for infringement.

Hovenkamp 20, \*Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship>)

In any event, patent infringement actions remain available in the event of infringement. Under the holdout theory, implementers supposedly band together and force a patentee (through the process of SEP choice) to agree to sub-market royalties in exchange for selection of its patents. The patentee, having no alternative, agrees. But a patentee who chooses not to participate has a damage action for patent infringement against implementers who use its invention without a li-cense.245 Further, this would likely be an action for willful infringement, leading to the possibility of multiple damages.246 To be sure, in winner take all patent races losers may go un- compensated, but that occurs only if implementers do not in-fringe their patents.247

#### 5G giants will just say NO--- small 5G companies have no bargaining power-- charts

Hassan 2020 (Muzammil Hassan – Manager at GreyB, Aman Kumar – Team Lead at GreyB, Matt Luby – Head of Solutions at Amplified IAM Top 300, 5/26/2020, “Updated Findings on Essentiality of 5G declared Standard Essential Patents” <https://www.greyb.com/5g-patents/> LAO)

Timeline

Description automatically generated

Chart, sunburst chart

Description automatically generated

#### Threats fail--- SEPs can’t be substituted

Mueller 2021 (Florian Mueller, app developer and an intellectual property activist. He consulted for Microsoft and writes the FOSSPatents blog about patent and copyright issues, 7-26-2021, "SEP Licensing Negotiation Groups," <http://www.fosspatents.com/2021/07/sep-licensing-negotiation-groups-part.html> LAO)

There isn't any such thing as a conventional supply-and-demand mechanism in SEP licensing. For example, patent holders can't reduce output: if they abandoned some of their patents, they'd just reduce the value of a portfolio. By contrast, if the likes of Continental, Dunlop, Bridgestone and Firestone ganged up on car makers, they could drive up the price--which is why competition authorities wouldn't allow such a cartel. As double patenting isn't possible (if it happens, only one of the patents survives), SEP portfolios are by definition complementary to each other. One SEP--or one portfolio--can't substitute for another. As an implementer, you can't "threaten" Huawei with the alternative of taking a SEP license from Ericsson instead (unless Huawei gives you a better deal). You need a license from both. SEP holders have an obligation to grant licenses on a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) basis. Comparable licenses go into the FRAND analysis, but comparability and substitutability are separate things.

## AT: CP---States

#### The Ninth Circuit imposed court-order limitations on antitrust law to preserve its balance with patent law.

Martino et al. 20, \*[Matthew M. Martino](https://www.skadden.com/professionals/m/martino-matthew-m) [Tara L. Reinhart](https://www.skadden.com/professionals/r/reinhart-tara-l) [Steven C. Sunshine](https://www.skadden.com/professionals/s/sunshine-steven-c) [Julia K. York](https://www.skadden.com/professionals/y/york-julia-k), works with clients at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; (August 14th, 2020, “Ninth Circuit Strikes Down Sweeping Injunction Against Qualcomm and Reins In Expansive Interpretation of Sherman Act”, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/08/ninth-circuit-strikes-down-sweeping-injunction)

In its highly anticipated decision, the Ninth Circuit panel unanimously rejected the lower court’s reasoning, vacating the judgment and reversing the worldwide injunction against Qualcomm. The panel concluded that the district court had erroneously imposed the antitrust duty to deal on Qualcomm, had impermissibly looked outside the relevant antitrust market in order to infer an anticompetitive act and had relied on outdated evidence of agreements that were terminated before the suit was filed to justify a broad, forward-looking global injunction. The Ninth Circuit further rejected the argument that a SEP holder’s violation of FRAND commitments could independently create antitrust liability, instead pointing to patent and contract law as sources for potential remedies. The decision reflects a considered effort to rei

n in the district court’s expansive interpretation of general antitrust principles and their specific application to SEP holders, as well as recognition that the antitrust laws aim to preserve companies’ incentives to innovate and compete. Recognizing that while “[a]nticompetitive behavior is illegal under federal antitrust law[,]” the panel was adamant that “[h]ypercompetitive behavior is not.”[7](https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/08/ninth-circuit-strikes-down-sweeping-injunction" \l "ftn7)

Rejection of District Court’s Expansive Interpretation of Antitrust Laws

The Ninth Circuit decision contains several notable conclusions regarding the scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and what constitutes cognizable antitrust harm.

#### State efforts to impose greater antitrust liability than established by federal courts will be preempted to protect that balance.

Samp 14, \*Richard A. Samp is the chief counsel for Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), a non-profit, public interest law firm in Washington, D.C. WLF filed an amicus brief in support of Love Terminal Partners. (2014, “The Role of State Antitrust Law in the Aftermath of Actavis”, https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=mjlst)

V. ACTAVIS’S PREEMPTIVE EFFECT

Application of state antitrust law to reverse payment settlements is not merely a hypothetical possibility. There are a fair number of pending lawsuits that challenge reverse payment settlements on state-law grounds. The California Supreme Court has agreed to review one such suit.74 In seeking affirmance of the appeals court’s dismissal of the suit, the defendants argue inter alia that the suit is preempted by federal law.75

As noted above, there is precedent for a finding that state antitrust law is preempted to the extent that it conflicts with the policy underlying a federal statute.76 Moreover, in the context of patent law, federal courts have not hesitated to preempt state laws that the courts deem to stand as an obstacle to accomplishing Congress’s objectives (i.e., encouraging efforts to develop new and useful products).77 To the extent that any portions of Actavis’s holding can be deemed to reflect the Court’s perception of Congress’s new-product-development objectives, a state law is preempted if it is inconsistent with that holding and seeks to impose a greater degree of antitrust liability on the parties to a reverse payment settlement.

Actavis’s treatment of settlements involving a compromise entry date appears to meet that description. Actavis held that federal antitrust liability could not arise from a settlement in which the generic manufacturer agrees not compete for a number of years and in return is rewarded with an exclusive license to market its product several years in advance of the patent’s expiration date.78 Accordingly, states are not permitted to impose antitrust liability under similar circumstances because doing so would upset the balance that, according to Actavis, Congress sought to achieve between antitrust and patent law.

Other issues left open by Actavis are likely to be answered in the years ahead. For example, the Supreme Court did not specify whether noncash benefits received by a generic manufacturer in connection with a patent settlement can ever serve as the basis for federal antitrust liability. If the Supreme Court eventually answers that question by stating: “No, federal antitrust law will not examine settlement benefits other than cash that flow to the infringing party,” then it is likely that state antitrust law would be required to conform to that rule. The potential grounds for such a ruling (a desire both to promote settlement of patent disputes and to uphold reliance interests in existing patents) are based largely on values embedded in federal patent law.

There is little reason to believe, however, that the Court would prevent application of state antitrust law to patent settlement agreements where state law is fully consistent with federal antitrust law. Even in areas subject to extensive federal regulation, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of states to engage in parallel regulation that is not inconsistent with the federal regulation.79 Unless the Court were to determine, as in Connell,80 that states could not be trusted to properly accommodate the objectives of the federal statute at issue (here, federal patent law), there is no reason to conclude that Congress would not have wanted states to be permitted to police the same sorts of anticompetitive conduct that is policed by federal antitrust law. Moreover, states are likely free to impose greater penalties on the proscribed conduct than is available under federal law. As the Court explained in California v. ARC America Corp., state antitrust law is not required to adhere to the same set of sanctions imposed by federal antitrust law.81

It seems reasonably clear, however, that Actavis prohibits states from adopting the procedural devices rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court—either a per se condemnation of reverse payment settlements or a presumption of illegality accompanied by “quick look” review. The Supreme Court rejected those approaches because it determined that in many cases there might well be pro-competitive economic justifications for reverse payment settlements and that presuming their illegality could result in the suppression of economically useful conduct.82 State antitrust laws that adopted the FTC’s proposed presumption of illegality would be subject to similar criticism, and thus would likely be impliedly preempted as inconsistent with the careful balance between antitrust and patent law established by Actavis.

CONCLUSION

Because Actavis left so many questions unanswered regarding the application of federal antitrust law to patent settlement agreements, the extent to which federal law preempts the application of state antitrust law to such agreements remains similarly unsettled. One can be reasonably confident that if private plaintiffs become dissatisfied with the results of pending litigation under federal antitrust law, they will turn with increasing frequency to state antitrust law as an alternative remedy. Even if state law ends up doing no more than “parallel” federal antitrust law, defendants are likely to incur substantial litigation costs fending off such state claims in the years to come.

## AT: DA---FTC

#### FTC is excessively devoting resources to enforcing patent holdup now.

Morris 9/17/21, \*Angela Morris, Deputy editor at IAM Media; (September 17th, 2021, “The FTC creates a potential new US headache for SEP owners”, https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/the-ftc-creates-potential-new-us-headache-sep-owners)

SEP owners that may already be wary of potential Biden Administration regulatory changes now have a new threat to keep them up at night.

Over the summer the Federal Trade Commission [announced an expanded view](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ftc-expands-section-5-enforcement-7020931/) of its standalone enforcement authority to curb anti-competitive misconduct; and [now the agency has made it clear](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/ftc-streamlines-investigations-in-eight-enforcement-areas) that priority targets include “abuse of intellectual property” and “monopolistic practices”.

The agency’s description of the “anticompetitive and deceptive conduct” it seeks to curtail in the technology sector most likely will encompass alleged misconduct by standards essential patent (SEP) owners and their commitments to licensing on FRAND terms, according to IP and antitrust attorney Tim Syrett.

“The FTC has previously conducted two investigations where it found that SEP holders seeking injunctions against licensees was anti-competitive and presented a threat to innovation,” Syrett, who is a partner in Wilmer Hale in Washington DC, explains via email. “That may be an area where the FTC wants to continue to devote resources and is certainly an area where there can be harm to competition because of the hold-up power of SEPs.”

He adds that investment-backed patent assertion entities and patent aggregation organisations may also have reason to fear ITC investigations.

“Investment-backed patent assertion entities can obscure information about who actually owns or has an interest in patents that can harm both licensing and litigation,” says Syrett. “Further, we have seen a concerning rise of patent assertions where the incentives of investors to obtain outsized returns from patents trump any reasonable valuation of the patents’ worth, which can harm competition in the licensing of patents.”

IP owners in the pharmaceutical, technology and gasoline refining industries should also take note of the development, since the commission indicated that it would investigate potential abuses of IP rights that create anti-competitive and deceptive conduct in those spaces.

Big Tech companies and other large businesses would be advised to pay attention as well, given that another stated FTC aim is to target alleged abuses of their market power that stop entrepreneurs from competing.

The two resolutions were among a group of eight that a divided commission passed this month on a 3-2 vote, as the agency seeks to handle increased workload from high merger filings. Both resolutions, effective for 10 years, direct the agency to use its compulsory processes to obtain documents and testimony through either demands or subpoenas to investigate allegations that would be a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.

#### No resources are being put into AI now — just in the future and FTC focus on health care and education — they cut from that

James V. Fazio 21. Special counsel in the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, with Liisa M. Thomas, 3/11. “What Is FTC’s Course Under Biden?” https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-ftc-s-course-under-biden

The new acting FTC chair, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, recently signaled that the FTC may increase enforcement and penalties in the privacy and data security realm. Slaughter pointed to several areas of focus for the FTC this year, which companies will want to keep in mind: Notifying Consumers About FTC Allegations: Slaughter referred favorably to two recent cases: (1) the Everalbum biometric settlement from earlier this year (which we wrote about at the time); and (2) the Flo Health settlement over alleged deceptive data sharing practices (which we also wrote about at the time). In drawing on these two cases, Slaughter indicated that in future cases the FTC intends to include as part of any settlement a requirement to notify customers of any FTC allegations. This, she said, would allow consumers to “vote with their feet” and help them decide whether to recommend their services to others. FTC Intent to Plead All Relevant Violations: According to Slaughter, another lesson the FTC is taking from the Flo case is to include in the cases it brings all potentially applicable violations of all relevant privacy-related laws. In the Flo case, Slaughter said the FTC should have pleaded a violation of the Health Breach Notification Rule, which requires that vendors of personal health records notify consumers of data breaches. Focus on Ed Tech and COPPA: Given the explosive growth of education technology during COVID-19, the FTC is conducting an industry sweep of the industry. Related to this, the FTC is reviewing its Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule. This goes beyond the refresh the agency did of their FAQs earlier in the pandemic (which we wrote about at the time). For now, Slaughter reminds companies that parental consent is needed before collecting information online from children under the age of 13. Examination of Health Apps: The FTC will take a closer look at health apps, including telehealth and contact tracing apps, as more and more consumers are relying on such apps to manage their health during the pandemic. Overlap Between Competition and Privacy: Slaughter also indicated that it is worth looking at situations where there may be not only privacy concerns, but antitrust as well. Because the FTC has a dual mission (consumer protection and competition) she notes that it has a “structural advantage” over other regulators in that it can look at these issues, especially since -she states- “many of the largest players in digital markets are as powerful as they are because of the breadth of their access to and control over consumer data.” Racial Equality and AI/Biometrics/Geotracking: Slaughter noted that COVID-19 is exacerbating racial inequities. She pointed to the unequal access to technology, as well as algorithmic discrimination (the idea that discrimination offline becomes embedded into algorithmic system logic). The FTC intends to focus on algorithmic discrimination, as well as on the discrimination potentially embedded into facial recognition technologies. (This mirrors concerns that gave rise to the recent Portland facial recognition law, which we recently wrote about). Finally, Slaughter commented on the use of location data to identify characteristics of Black Lives Matter protesters, and said she is concerned about the misuse of location data to track Americans engaged in constitutionally protected speech. Putting it Into Practice: Companies that operate health apps, that are in the education technology space, or that use algorithms or facial recognition tools will want to keep in mind that these are areas of focus for the FTC. And for everyone, keep in mind that the FTC has indicated it will beef up privacy law penalties and will ask for more notification to injured consumers.

**FTC lacks resources to enforce privacy**

John O. **McGinnis**\* **and** Linda **Sun**\*\* **20** – \*George C. Dix Professor, Northwestern University, and Associate-Designate, Wilmer Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP. “Unifying Antitrust Enforcement for the Digital Age.” Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 20-20. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3669087

The FTC needs more **resources** to adequately address the nation’s growing privacy concerns. Currently, the FTC oversees both consumer protection—encompassing privacy—and antitrust,249 making the FTC the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement250 and the nation’s de-facto privacy agency.251 The agency has long-standing experience in enforcing privacy statutes252 and also has special privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality tech forensics to track invasions of privacy.253 The FTC, however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern technology. Very few Americans feel conﬁdent in the privacy of their information in the digital age.254 According to a 2019 study, over 80% of Americans feel that they have little to no control over the data collected on them by companies and the government.255 To adequately address privacy concerns, the FTC needs more resources.256 The agency has been explicit that it needs more manpower to police tech companies. In requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director Joseph Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire additional staff and bring more privacy

cases.257 A former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which houses the

privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully understaffed.”258

As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees dedicated to privacy and data

security, compared to 500 and 110 employees at comparable agencies in the UK. and Ireland, respectively.259 Without more lawyers, investigators, and technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, **forgo them altogether**.260 Currently, the FT C’s resources are **spread thin across multiple missions**, to the **detriment of its privacy efforts**. Removing the agency’s antitrust responsibilities would reallocate resources from the antitrust department to its privacy unit and other areas of consumer protection. Further, it would free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee this essential effort.261

#### 1---private action---the plan buttresses private enforcement to remedy SSO patent holdup---that zeroes the link.

Speegle 12, \*Adam Speegle, J.D., (May 2012, “Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse on the Standard-Setting Process Setting Process”, <https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=mlr>)

* Plan is not FTC activism
* Requiring SSO’s to administer rules lets the private sector self-manage
* No new staff/resources required
* No FTC monitoring required
* If the FTC does have to do anything, number of cases will be limited due to deterrence, which solves an excessive workload

This too is not fatal to the approach. The proposed rule uses a light touch in that it only buttresses rules established by SSOs. Because the rule would support actions by the private sector to manage their own activities rather than introducing additional agency oversight, Congress would be unlikely to react the way it did when the FTC's activism in the consumer protection arena evoked fears of excessive government intervention.

One final concern with the approach is that it will demand more of the FTC in a regulatory capacity than the FTC is capable of handling. For example, under any rule where the FTC would be called upon to enforce RAND terms, the FTC might fall into the role of license-rate regulator, determining which licensing fees are reasonable and which are unreasonable. But the FTC is a relatively small institution with limited resources.1 62 Some are concerned that under such a scenario the Commission would have to bring on new staff with expertise in the technology sector to monitor the reasonableness of licensing terms arising from SSO commitments.163

This concern is unlikely to be serious under the proposed formulation. As to the problem of determining "reasonableness," the FTC has already developed expertise in this area and, in fact, recently authored a report putting forth workable solutions to the problem of calculating "reasonableness" in the context of RAND commitments. 64 Further, the FTC would not need to establish itself as a monitoring body and would not incur the related costs of increases in staff and resources. Rather, enforcement of the proposed rule would operate similarly to the FTC's enforcement of its consumer protection rules. Under that regime, companies and individuals report fraudulent activity that violates one of the FTC's rules, which the Commission then investigates and, at its discretion, prosecutes. 16 Because the burden would be on the private sector to report in such a regime, the FTC would not need to monitor SSO activity. And as with consumer protection enforcement, a small number of decisive enforcement actions against abusive firms should act as a deterrent sufficient to decrease the FTC's litigation workload. 166 Thus, despite some legitimate concerns with the approach of enforcement by rule, those concerns are not fatal to the strategy. Moreover, the next Section demonstrates that there are also general benefits to enforcement by rule that weigh in favor of the approach.

## AT: DA---Sua Sponte

#### Court is politicized and illegitimate now

Lubert 10/20

(Steven Lubet is a legal scholar and author. Lubet is the Edna B. and Ednyfed H. Williams Memorial Professor of Law at Northwestern University. “A politicized Supreme Court? That was the point” https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/577428-a-politicized-supreme-court-that-was-the-point)**AB**

If Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett had been better aware of that history, she might have chosen her words more carefully in a recent appearance at the University of Louisville. As it was, Barrett stood next to Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), who founded the university’s eponymous McConnell Center in 1991, and declared that her objective that day was to convince the audience that the Supreme Court “is not comprised of a bunch of partisan hacks.” Barrett’s protestation did not come out of nowhere. Just like Nixon, Clinton and Trump, she was responding to very pointed criticism in the press, in this case the many charges that the Supreme Court had become thoroughly politicized by Trump’s three appointments, which created a powerful 6-3 conservative super-majority. Nor was Barrett the only justice to embark on what has been called a “charm offensive” to shore up the Court’s newly-questioned legitimacy. Delivering the annual Tocqueville Lecture at Notre Dame, Justice Clarence Thomas told the audience that his colleagues do not rule on the basis of “personal preferences,” and he rebuked those who believe that a justice is “like a politician.” Also speaking at Notre Dame, Justice Samuel Alito denied that any of the Court’s recent rulings had been “sneaky or dangerous.” He took caustic aim at the Court’s critics, dismissing the "political talk [that] feeds unprecedented efforts to intimidate the court or damage it as an independent institution." Justice Stephen Breyer was only slightly less defensive – studiously avoiding any suggestion of hackery or sneakiness – in a series of interviews about his new book. Responding to calls for his retirement, while Joe Biden is president and Democrats still control the Senate, Breyer insisted that “a judge’s loyalty is to the rule of law, not the political party that helped to secure his or her appointment.” However much the Barrett/Thomas/Alito/Breyer attestations resonated with their friends and supporters, they did nothing to defuse the increasing claims of politicization. As Dahlia Lithwick and Mark Joseph Stern pointed out on Slate, **the Court has lately fulfilled a virtual Republican wish-list**, making it “harder for minorities to challenge **racist voter suppression laws**, harder for **unions to organize**, and harder to learn **who is contributing funds to political groups**,” while also allowing Texas’s bounty-hunting **anti-abortion law to take effect (in an unsigned opinion issued at midnight**). If it wasn’t a politicized court, it certainly had the appearance of one. Just last week, President Biden’s Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States released a lengthy set of “discussion materials” that undermined any meaningful attempts at depoliticization, or even balance, for the Court. Statutory expansion beyond the current nine justices – supported by a growing number of Democrats and clearly permissible under the Constitution – was essentially brushed off for its ostensibly “negative effects” on the Court’s “long-term legitimacy” that could “undermine its role in our legal system.” (At least five of the 34 commissioners have publicly disagreed with this supposition.) Republicans, of course, never had qualms about tinkering with the Supreme Court’s composition, having fashioned an eight-member court during the nearly year-long blockade of Merrick Garland’s nomination in 2016. But determining the Court’s size is evidently an exclusively Republican prerogative. The Commission did allow that term limits might be desirable, although Biden later said that he is opposed to the idea. In any case, that reform would likely require a Constitutional amendment, which would not be fully operative until somewhere between 21 and 46 years after ratification (depending on the details). Under most term limit proposals, a child born tomorrow could grow up, attend college, graduate from law school, and still be sworn into the Supreme Court bar by Justices Barrett, Kavanaugh and Gorsuch. Meanwhile, Mitch McConnell is surely smiling, delighted that he has masterminded the formation of a Republican-friendly Supreme Court that may endure for decades. If McConnell were asked whether the Court has been politicized, he might well quote then-candidate Barack Obama’s candid response to a question about his youthful marijuana use. Did he inhale? “That was the point.”

#### Courts create a test case

Adamany 90 (David, Professor – Wayne State, The American Courts: A Critical Assessment, p. 9)

Since Congress adopted the Judges Bill of 1925, most cases on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets have been by writ of certiorari — a request for the justices to hear cases that they may, but are not required, to hear. Under Supreme Court Rule 17, which gives broad categories of cases that the Court may hear, at least four justices must agree to hear a case before it is considered by the Court. Some cases on the appellate docket have been “appeals by right,” certain cases involving the constitutionality of state or federal laws or state constitutional provisions. By law, the Court was required to hear these cases; but the justices developed broad discretion by rejecting cases that failed to pose a substantial federal question as defined by the justices. In 1988, Congress revised the law virtually to eliminate appeals by right, thus giving the justices almost complete choice about what cases to decide. With more than 5.000 cases pending annually, the Supreme Court can almost always find a case to raise any policy issue that the justices wish to decide. Chief Justice Earl Warren apparently asked his law clerks to fmd a case on the Court’s docket that would allow the justices to overrule a previous decision holding that there was no right for the poor to have an attorney in every criminal trial. The clerks found such a case, and the Court used it to announce a new constitutional rule guaranteeing the right to counsel (Danelski and Danelski 1989, 508). The Court has sometimes gone to great lengths to find the issue it wants to decide. In the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 617 [1961]), the Court held that illegally seized evidence could not be used in state criminal trials. But the dissenting justices accused the majority of “reaching out” to find that issue in the brief of amicus curiae, because the jurisdictional statements, briefs, and oral arguments of the parties had all been devoted to First Amendment free speech issues. Where the Court cannot find an issue on its docket, it may order parties to argue an issue that the justices want to consider. Over the strong objection of four justices that the majority was raising “a question not presented” by the parties, five justices ordered the parties in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (485 U.S. 617 [1988]) to reargue the case to determine whether the Court’s 1976 interpretation of a federal civil rights statute should be reconsidered and changed. The majority pointed out four previous cases within the past twenty years when the Court had also ordered reargument to determine whether an earlier decision should be reconsidered and changed.

#### No modeling---especially over antitrust

Law & Versteeg 12—Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law @ Washington University & Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law @ University of Virginia [David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 87, 2012

The appeal of American constitutionalism as a model for other countries appears to be waning in more ways than one. Scholarly attention has thus far focused on global judicial practice: There is a growing sense, backed by more than purely anecdotal observation, that foreign courts cite the constitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court less frequently than before.267 But the behavior of those who draft and revise actual constitutions exhibits a similar pattern. Our empirical analysis shows that the content of the U.S. Constitution is¶ becoming increasingly atypical by global standards. Over the last three decades, other countries have become less likely to model the rights-related provisions of¶ their own constitutions upon those found in the Constitution. Meanwhile, global adoption of key structural features of the Constitution, such as federalism, presidentialism, and a decentralized model of judicial review, is at best stable and at worst declining. In sum, rather than leading the way for global¶ constitutionalism, the U.S. Constitution appears instead to be losing its appeal as¶ a model for constitutional drafters elsewhere. The idea of adopting a constitution may still trace its inspiration to the United States, but the manner in which constitutions are written increasingly does not.

If the U.S. Constitution is indeed losing popularity as a model for other countries, what—or who—is to blame? At this point, one can only speculate as to the actual causes of this decline, but four possible hypotheses suggest themselves: (1) the advent of a superior or more attractive competitor; (2) a general decline in American hegemony; (3) judicial parochialism; (4) constitutional obsolescence; and (5) a creed of American exceptionalism.

With respect to the first hypothesis, there is little indication that the U.S. Constitution has been displaced by any specific competitor. Instead, the notion that a particular constitution can serve as a dominant model for other countries may itself be obsolete. There is an increasingly clear and broad consensus on the types of rights that a constitution should include, to the point that one can articulate the content of a generic bill of rights with considerable precision.269 Yet it is difficult to pinpoint a specific constitution—or regional or international human rights instrument—that is clearly the driving force behind this emerging paradigm. We find only limited evidence that global constitutionalism is following the lead of either newer national constitutions that are often cited as influential, such as those of Canada and South Africa, or leading international and regional human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. Although Canada in particular does appear to exercise a quantifiable degree of constitutional influence or leadership, that influence is not uniform and global but more likely reflects the emergence and evolution of a shared practice of constitutionalism among common law countries.270 Our findings suggest instead that the development of global constitutionalism is a polycentric and multipolar¶ process that is not dominated by any particular country.271 The result might be likened to a global language of constitutional rights, but one that has been collectively forged rather than modeled upon a specific constitution.

Another possibility is that America’s capacity for constitutional leadership is at least partly a function of American “soft power” more generally.272 It is reasonable to suspect that the overall influence and appeal of the United States and its institutions have a powerful spillover effect into the constitutional arena. The popularity of American culture, the prestige of American universities, and the efficacy of American diplomacy can all be expected to affect the appeal of American constitutionalism, and vice versa. All are elements of an overall American brand, and the strength of that brand helps to determine the strength of each of its elements. Thus, any erosion of the American brand may also diminish the appeal of the Constitution for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the Constitution itself. Likewise, a decline in American constitutional influence of the type documented in this Article is potentially indicative of a broader decline in American soft power.

There are also factors specific to American constitutionalism that may be¶ reducing its appeal to foreign audiences. Critics suggest that the Supreme Court has undermined the global appeal of its own jurisprudence by failing to acknowledge the relevant intellectual contributions of foreign courts on questions of common concern,273 and by pursuing interpretive approaches that lack acceptance elsewhere.274 On this view, the Court may bear some responsibility for the declining influence of not only its own jurisprudence, but also the actual U.S. Constitution: one might argue that the Court’s approach to constitutional issues has undermined the appeal of American constitutionalism more generally, to the point that other countries have become unwilling to look either to American constitutional jurisprudence or to the U.S. Constitution itself for inspiration.275

It is equally plausible, however, that responsibility for the declining appeal of American constitutionalism lies with the idiosyncrasies of the Constitution itself rather than the proclivities of the Supreme Court. As the oldest formal constitution still in force, and one of the most rarely amended constitutions in the world,276 the U.S. Constitution contains relatively few of the rights that have become popular in recent decades,277 while some of the provisions that it does contain may appear increasingly problematic, unnecessary, or even undesirable with the benefit of two hundred years of hindsight.278 It should therefore come as little surprise if the U.S. Constitution¶ strikes those in other countries–or, indeed, members of the U.S. Supreme Court279–as out of date and out of line with global practice.280 Moreover, even if the Court were committed to interpreting the Constitution in tune with global fashion, it would still lack the power to update the actual text of the document.

Indeed, efforts by the Court to update the Constitution via interpretation may actually reduce the likelihood of formal amendment by rendering such amendment unnecessary as a practical matter.281 As a result, there is only so much that the U.S. Supreme Court can do to make the U.S. Constitution an¶ attractive formal template for other countries. The obsolescence of the Constitution, in turn, may undermine the appeal of American constitutional jurisprudence: foreign courts have little reason to follow the Supreme Court’s lead on constitutional issues if the Supreme Court is saddled with the interpretation of an unusual and obsolete constitution.282 No amount of ingenuity or solicitude for foreign law on the part of the Court can entirely divert attention from the fact that the Constitution itself is an increasingly atypical document.

One way to put a more positive spin upon the U.S. Constitution’s status as a global outlier is to emphasize its role in articulating and defining what is unique about American national identity. Many scholars have opined that formal constitutions serve an expressive function as statements of national identity.283 This view finds little support in our own empirical findings, which suggest instead that constitutions tend to contain relatively standardized packages of rights.284 Nevertheless, to the extent that constitutions do serve such a function, the distinctiveness of the U.S. Constitution may simply reflect the uniqueness of America’s national identity. In this vein, various scholars have argued that the U.S. Constitution lies at the very heart of an “American creed of exceptionalism,” which combines a belief that the United States occupies a unique position in the world with a commitment to the qualities that set the United States apart from other countries.285 From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to make use of foreign and international law in constitutional cases amounts not to parochialism, but rather to respect for the exceptional character of the nation and its constitution.286

Unfortunately, it is clear that the reasons for the declining influence of American constitutionalism cannot be reduced to anything as simple or attractive as a longstanding American creed of exceptionalism. Historically, American exceptionalism has not prevented other countries from following the example set by American constitutionalism. The global turn away from the American model is a relatively recent development that postdates the Cold War. If the U.S. Constitution does in fact capture something profoundly unique about the United States, it has surely been doing so for longer than the last thirty years. A complete explanation of the declining influence of American constitutionalism in other countries must instead be sought in more recent history, such as the wave of constitution-making that followed the end of the Cold War.287 During this period, America’s newfound position as lone superpower might have been expected to create opportunities for the spread of American constitutionalism. But this did not come to pass.

Once global constitutionalism is understood as the product of a polycentric evolutionary process, it is not difficult to see why the U.S. Constitution is playing an increasingly peripheral role in that process. No evolutionary process favors a specimen that is frozen in time. At least some of the responsibility for the declining global appeal of American constitutionalism lies not with the Supreme Court, or with a broader penchant for exceptionalism, but rather with the static character of the Constitution itself. If the United States were to revise the Bill of Rights today—with the benefit of over two centuries of experience, and in a manner that addresses contemporary challenges while remaining faithful to the nation’s best traditions—there is no guarantee that other countries would follow its lead. But the

world would surely pay close attention. Pg. 78-83

# 1AR

## Adv — Innovation

#### ex ante valuation preserves profit due to mass licensing volume

Stern 18, \*Richard H. Stern, Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington University Law School. A Washington, D.C. patent and antitrust attorney, Stern was Chief of the Patent Section of the US Justice Department’s Antitrust Division during the Nixon and Ford Administrations; (2018, “Who Should Own the Benefits of Standardization and the Value It Creates?”, https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1439&context=mjlst)

D. INCENTIVIZE ME OR I’LL DEFECT

A highly theoretical argument is often made by SEP owner spokesmen—that lessened compensation to SEP owners will “disincentivize” them from creating technology and contributing it to standardization, stagnating further standardization. For example:

If the SEP holder cannot capture any of the value from standardization that its technology creates for the standard, it will have a dampened incentive to continue contributing its best technologies to SSOs. In the long run, the quality of technologies contributed to a future standard—and the expected value of that new standard—would decrease. The SEP holder’s decision to contribute its technologies to a standard depends on the compensation that an SEP holder expects to obtain from such a contribution, compared with the SEP holder’s alternative option to monetize its invention outside the standard. . . . If the SEP holder expects not to be compensated fully for its contributions, it will not commit its most valuable technologies to the standard.431

But the amount of dampening of incentive (assuming that we do not already have enough or more than enough incentive for smartphones) may well be outweighed in impact by the prospect of nonetheless gaining first-user and head-start advantage from incorporation of one’s technology into a standard, and the opportunity to increase one’s equipment sales (anointed with the imprimatur of the standard),432 even if one cannot also obtain monopoly profits as well, from SEP royalties. In a sense, those advantages are a form of “the compensation that an SEP holder expects to obtain” from such a SEP contribution, but the commentator fails to take those significant incentives into consideration.433 Moreover, the supposed “SEP holder’s alternative option to monetize its invention outside the standard” may be a figment of the SEP holder spokesman’s imagination.434 If an alternative technology becomes standard, the only opportunity to monetize the withheld invention may be to incorporate the technology into unsaleable non-standard products. Defection may be a poor business strategy.

#### Ex post, patentees are motivated to overclaim patents---creating a thicket of nonessential patents that overburden implementers.

Hovenkamp 20, \*Herbert J. Hovenkamp is James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; (2020, “FRAND and Antitrust”, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3095&context=faculty_scholarship>)

Having a patent declared standard essential can increase its value considerably, mainly because the promise of a license at a reasonable rate steers developmental decision making in favor of that particular technology. When a firm makes a commitment to develop its products under a particular standard, it wants assurance that it will have a durable right to operate under that standard at reasonable royalty rates. This process naturally leads to the creation of considerable path dependence in standards. It encourages firms to develop their own technology in ways that ensure interoperability but that can be costly to reverse after the fact.30

This phenomenon of increased value for SEPs also motivates patent owning firms to “over-claim”—that is, to assert that patents are standard essential when subsequent litigation or evaluation determines that they are not. While FRAND agreements require participants to declare relevant patents thought to be essential, the rate of actual declaration far exceeds any rational boundary. As many as one-third to more than half of declared SEPs are very likely not essential to the standard for which they were declared,31 and allegations about the practice of over-declaring are currently being litigated as potential antitrust violations.32 In fact, overall infringement rates for SEP patents are not materially different from those for non-SEP patents.33 A declaration of non-infringement means that, although the patent might be valid, it does not in fact read on the defendant’s particular device or process. In effect, the patent is not a part of the defendant’s technology, and thus cannot be essential. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, for the most part, SSOs have no process up front for reviewing or questioning individual participants’ declarations that a patent they are offering is in fact both valid and standard essential.34

Ex ante, a patent may offer one of many alternative technological paths to a certain goal. However, ex post, after a standard has been adopted and others have developed their technologies in reliance, the range of acceptable alternatives can decrease dramatically. As a result, the patent whose path is adopted becomes much more valuable.35 In that case, a firm’s ability to evade the FRAND obligation by charging selectively higher royalties to some licensees or conditioning licenses on the purchase of other technology can be extremely lucrative for the patentee but costly to implementers of the standard and disruptive of the SSO’s developmental goals.36 In its Qualcomm decision noted above, the Ninth Circuit did not indicate any awareness of these motivations or their potential for harm.37

#### Majority of the time, SEP’s are not necessary for standard implementation.

Gilbert 20, \*Richard J. Gilbert is an [American Economist](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=American_Economist&action=edit&redlink=1), professor at [UC Berkeley](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley) from 1976 to 2000, and founder of [LECG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LECG_Corporation) Corp. ([Law and Economics Consulting Group](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LECG_Corporation)). Richard ('Rich') Gilbert served as Deputy Assistant General in the [Antitrust Division](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice_Antitrust_Division) of the [U.S. Department of Justice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice) in the White House from 1993 to 1995. He led the development of Joint Department of [Justice and Federal Trade Commission](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Justice_and_Federal_Trade_Commission&action=edit&redlink=1) [Antitrust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition_law) Guidelines for the Licensing of [Intellectual Property](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_property) and is currently [Emeritus Professor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emeritus_Professor) of Economics at the [University of California at Berkeley](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley); (2020, “Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy”, https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/innovation-matters)

Unfortunately, SDOs have not defined the limits on FRAND terms. Furthermore, they do not have uniform disclosure requirements or uniform definitions of “essential.” Studies show that many patents declared essential to common standards are not technically nor economically necessary to implement the standard.[17](javascript:void(0))

#### Ex post royalties are not necessary to motivate innovation which is the only thing the aff changes

Bosworth et al. 17, \*D. Scott Bosworth is a Principal Economist at Nathan Associates; \*Russell W. Mangum is Executive Vice President at the American Antitrust Institute and Associate Professor of Economics in the School of Business and Economics at Concordia University Irvine; \* Eric Matolo is the Vice President of Cirque Analytics; (October 28th, 2017, “FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents”, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-6011-3\_2#Sec10)

The common justification for intellectual property law is that inventions must be properly protected to allow inventors to be rewarded for inventions, thereby stimulating innovation. However, promoting inventions and innovation does not justify, nor does it require, rewarding patent owners beyond the value of the technology the intellectual property is meant to protect. Allowing patent holders to extract the value of the network effect created from a standard rewards the patentees based on value beyond the patented technology. Without FRAND terms the network effects value will flow to SEP holders. Proper FRAND terms that keep SEP holders from extracting the value of network effects can still leave the efficient level of return for innovators—that based on the technology itself. In other words, extracting the value of network effects by SEP holders is not necessary to appropriately motivate innovation. Any value of the standardization resulting from collaborative efforts during the SSO process may ultimately be available in the public domain.

## Adv — Cyber

## CP — Collusion